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RESURRECTING THE PROMISE OF BROWN:





The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education held
that separate educational facilities were "inherently unequal." After
tolerating substantial delay and evasion of the requirements of Brown,
the Court eventually required school districts to dismantle the dual
systems by eliminating all traces of separate schools and creating
integrated schools. In contrast to numerous scholars that have
contended that many of the Court's later school desegregation
decisions withdrew from or grew weary of school desegregation, this
Article argues that the effect of many of the Court's leading school
desegregation decisions was to reconstitutionalize segregated schools.
Furthermore, the Court's recent decision in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 will exacerbate
this effect by making it substantially more difficult for school districts
to remedy such schools. This Article concludes with a proposal for how
the President and U.S. Department of Education could implement a
comprehensive plan to resurrect Brown's promise to end separate and
unequal schools.
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INTRODUCTION
Far too many of the nation's schoolchildren attend schools that
remain separate and unequal, and racial isolation in schools is
increasing! Although the nation achieved significant desegregation in
1. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECTIPROYECTO
DERECHOS CIVILES (UCLA), HISTORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING
RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 3 (2007),
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/reversals-reseg-need.pdf
("The trends shown in this report are those of increasing isolation and profound
inequality."); Susan E. Eaton & Gary Orfield, Introduction to DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION xiii, xiv
(Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996) [hereinafter DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION] ("[M]ore that forty years after Brown, racial separation both between
and within school districts is an ordinary, unnoticed fixture in K-12 education. And there is
a great deal of evidence to support Brown's basic premise that in American society,
separate schools are inherently unequal."); Goodwin Liu, "History Will Be Heard": An
Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville Decision, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 53, 73 (2008)
("Our public schools are still segregated, and they are still unequal."); Daniel J. Losen,
Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act's
Race-Conscious Accountability, 47 HOw. L.J. 243, 244 (2004) ("Today our schools are
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some regions, approximately three-quarters of Black and Latino
students currently attend a school in which a majority of the students
are minorities.2 Nationwide 38% of Black children attend schools that
enroll 90 to 100% minority students with more than 51% of Black
children in the Northeast and 46% of the Black children in the
Midwest attending such schools.3 Similarly, 39% of Latino students
attend schools that enroll 90 to 100% minority students with more
than more than 45% of Latino children in the Northeast and 41% of
Latino children in the West attending such schools.4 The South
achieved the greatest desegregation; however, by 2005 the percentage
of Black students attending majority White schools in the South had
fallen below the level that existed in 1970 to 27% of Black students.5
Scholars have thoroughly documented that the persistence of racial
isolation in schools matters a great deal because of the negative
impact that racial isolation inflicts on educational opportunities and
outcomes.6
The Supreme Court recently issued a decision that will make it
substantially more difficult for school districts to develop policies to
combat the growing racial isolation in the nation's schools.7 In Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,8 the
Court issued a 5-4 decision that struck down the race-based student
assignment plans adopted by the school boards in Seattle and
Louisville.9 The decision will make it increasingly difficult for districts
to create diverse school settings because the decision left only an
exceedingly narrow avenue for using approaches that employ the
most direct and effective measure-a racial classification-to
becoming segregated again while equality of educational opportunity has proved to be an
elusive goal.").
2. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 1, at 28, 35.
3. See id. at 33.
4. See id. at 35-36.
5. See id. at 22-23.
6. See, e.g., Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos,
and Unequal Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 1, at 53, 64-71
(noting disparities in achievement and curriculum between racially isolated and suburban
schools); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to
Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50
B.C. L. REV. 277, 327-36 (2009) (summarizing research on the harms of racial isolation);
Amy Stuart Wells & Erica Frankenberg, The Public Schools and the Challenge of the
Supreme Court's Integration Decision, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 178, 179-83 (2007)
(providing the results of research that finds racially segregated schools are detrimental to
students).
7. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 285-94.
8. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
9. Id. at 732-36.
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accomplish this goal.10 Justice Kennedy's opinion, which provided the
fifth vote for striking down the plans, sanctions the use of race-neutral
means to promote diversity and avoid racial isolation.1 His opinion,
which is likely to serve as an influential decision in determining the
constitutional future of efforts to create diverse schools," will lead
districts that pursue these goals to focus their attention and efforts on
selecting the most effective race-neutral approaches. 3
The growing racial isolation in the public schools and the recent
Supreme Court decision in Parents Involved that makes even
voluntary efforts to reduce racial isolation more difficult to pursue
raise important questions about how the nation got to this moment in
history and what can be done in the future to address this growing
educational and social crisis. Numerous scholars have traced how the
Court and other political and social events have allowed the nation to
return to separate and unequal schools. 4 For example, one prominent
argument, championed in substantial part by Gerald Rosenberg, is
that the Court lacked the capacity to undertake the type of social
change that was needed to desegregate schools. 5 Numerous scholars
portray the Court as an institution that has withdrawn from school
desegregation. For example, prominent constitutional law scholar
Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that several of the Court's leading
desegregation decisions deconstitutionalize school segregation
because the federal courts are withdrawing from responsibility for
school desegregation. 6 Mark Tushnet has contended that the Court's
school desegregation jurisprudence has embraced a "we've done
enough" theory that declares an end to school desegregation even
10. See Erica Frankenberg, School Segregation, Desegregation, and Integration: What
Do These Terms Mean in a Post-Parents Involved in Community Schools, Racially
Transitioning Society?, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 533, 534 (2008); Robinson, supra
note 6, at 280; Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 6, at 179.
11. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
12. Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy's Opinion in Parents Involved: Why
Fifty Years of Experience Shows Kennedy is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735, 735 (2008).
13. Robinson, supra note 6, at 293-94 (arguing that the narrow legal avenue for racial
classifications will lead districts to use race-neutral approaches to promoting diversity and
avoiding racial isolation).
14. See, e.g., Eaton & Orfield, supra note 1, at xiv; Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full
Circle: The Journey from Separate but Equal to Separate and Unequal Schools, 2 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 3-5 (2007).
15. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 70-71, 155-56 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 2d ed. 2008).
16. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOy. U. CHI.
L.J. 111, 112, 115-19 (2004) ("The federal courts are withdrawing from overseeing school
desegregation; it is an area of profound deconstitutionalization.").
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though desegregation has not achieved the results that the Court
declared were required.17 Similarly, Bradley Joondeph has argued
that the Court abandoned court-enforced school desegregation even
when desegregation had not remedied the segregation. 8 Such
theories depict the Court as an institution that removed itself or the
Constitution from school desegregation.
While some of these arguments are persuasive, this Article
contends that rather than withdraw from desegregation, the effect of
the Court's decisions can better be understood as decisions that
reconstitutionalized the segregated schools that the Court had
previously condemned. "Reconstitutionalize" captures when the
Court validates or approves of an action that it previously declared
unconstitutional. The affirmative nature of the totality of the Court's
decisions is revealed only by their consistent effect. If the Court were
intending to withdraw from school desegregation but were neutral as
to the effect of its withdrawal, it seems likely that the Court simply
could have refused to review lower court decisions in this area.
Instead, the Court intervened in desegregation cases and unfailingly
issued decisions that validated the failure to achieve integrated
schools or approved of a swift return to schools that primarily
educated students of one race. Thus, in contrast with other scholarly
portrayals of a Court that withdrew from school desegregation,
understanding that the effect of some of the Court's leading
desegregation decisions was to reconstitutionalize segregation
highlights the important role that the Court played in shaping the
current educational landscape.
In arguing that the Court's decisions had the effect of
reconstitutionalizing segregation, this Article does not contend that
the Court currently would uphold a law that intentionally and openly
segregates students between schools along racial lines. Undoubtedly,
the Court would strike down such a law as unconstitutional. Rather,
this Article argues that the totality of the effect of many of the Court's
leading desegregation decisions has been to approve of student
assignment plans that accomplish a similar result by condoning a
failure to dismantle or a swift return to separate and unequal schools
in school districts that had been intentionally segregated.
Furthermore, the Court in Parents Involved exacerbated this effect by
17. Mark V. Tushnet, The "We've Done Enough" Theory of School Desegregation, 39
How. L.J. 767, 767 (1996).
18. Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of
Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REV. 597, 599 (1996).
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making it substantially more difficult for school districts to remedy
such schools.
After analyzing how some of the Supreme Court's leading
desegregation decisions had the effect of reconstitutionalizing
segregation, this Article proposes ways in which the executive branch
could renew its efforts to remedy separate and unequal schools. This
Article develops such proposals for two principal reasons. First, racial
isolation in public schools is presently rising.19 In fact, as leading
education law scholar James Ryan has recently noted, "[s]chools
today are as segregated as they were in the late 1960s before busing
began.""° The rise in racial isolation along with the subordinating
effects that accompany it21 need sustained attention from the federal
government because the states generally have proven unwilling to
remedy the growing racial isolation.22
Second, and more importantly, the role of the federal
government in public schools has risen to historic heights in recent
years. The second Bush administration was able to obtain bipartisan
support for the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB") 23 despite the
fact that it represented the most significant federal involvement in
public elementary and secondary schools in the nation's history.24 In
spearheading this expansion, the Bush administration acted in direct
contradiction to prior Republican efforts to limit the federal role in
education.25 One scholar has noted that passage of the NCLB
occurred because both parties and the American public now realize
that substantial federal action will be necessary to improve the
nation's schools.26 The widespread acceptance of an expanded federal
role in public schools will help make federal action to reduce racial
isolation in schools more palatable to the American public.
19. See, e.g., ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 1, at 3.
20. James E. Ryan, The Real Lessons of School Desegregation, in FROM
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION
73, 73 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009).
21. Orfield, supra note 6, at 64-71 (noting disparities in achievement and curriculum
in racially isolated and suburban schools); Robinson, supra note 6, at 327-36 (summarizing
the research on the harms of racial isolation); Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 6, at 179-
83 (explaining the negative effects of racially segregated schools).
22. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 1, at 8-11.
23. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1439 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
24. PATRICK J. MCGUINN, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965-2005, at 165-66, 179 (2006).
25. Id. at 169.
26. Id. at 165.
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The proposals noted here are particularly timely because
President Barack Obama's administration has continued to build on
the increase in federal involvement in education through the stimulus
bill entitled the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.7
The Act provided approximately $100 billion to education and is the
largest single allocation of federal aid to education in the nation's
history.28 The funds provide support to address state budget shortfalls,
assist low-income and special education students, as well as provide
student financial aid. 9 In addition, part of those funds will be used for
the Race to the Top Fund, which will allocate $4.3 billion through a
competitive grant program to states that focus on four reforms:
(a) Adopting internationally benchmarked standards and
assessments that prepare students for success in college and the
workplace; (b) Building data systems that measure student
success and inform teachers and principals about how they can
improve their practices; (c) Increasing teaching and principal
effectiveness and achieving equity in their distribution; and (d)
Turning around our lowest-achieving schools.30
The availability of these funds is already significantly influencing
policy and legislative action within states that are implementing
reforms which will enable them to qualify for the funds. These reform
initiatives include raising or eliminating state caps on charter schools
and removing legal obstacles that prevented the use of student
achievement data to evaluate teachers.3' Therefore, even without
reauthorization of the No Child Left Behind Act,32 the Obama
administration is substantially influencing the education priorities of
the nation's governors, chief state school officers, and school districts
27. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
28. Sam Dillon, Education Agency Will Offer Grants for Innovative Ideas, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A21 (stating that the stimulus bill allocated $100 billion to
education); Letter from Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec'y of Educ., to Governors and Chief State
School Officers 1 (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.ed.gov/programs/statestabilization/2009-394-
cover.doc ("[Tihis sweeping economic recovery package provides the largest one-time
Federal investment in education in our nation's history, more than $100 billion to help
save and create teaching jobs, preserve needed learning programs, and increase college
access.").
29. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
REPORT: SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS AND STATE-BY-STATE DATA 3 (2009), available at
http://www.ed.gov/policy/genleg/recovery/spending/arra-program-summary.pdf.
30. Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688, 59,688 (Nov. 18, 2009).
31. Erik W. Robelen, "Race to Top" Driving Policy Action Across States, EDUC. WK.,
Dec. 23, 2009 (available online only through a paid subscription service).
32. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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through conditions attached to the stimulus spending.33 Furthermore,
the priorities that the Obama administration is establishing for
reauthorizing the NCLB will likely build and expand upon the strong
federal role established in the NCLB rather than abandon that role.'
With this expanded federal role in education, new opportunities exist
and will continue to arise for the current and future Presidents to
support efforts to reduce racial isolation in schools.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I chronicles how the
Court made separate and unequal schools unconstitutional. Part II
challenges the portrayal of the Court's role as one of withdrawal and
fatigue and instead reveals several ways in which the effect of the
Court's decision was to reconstitutionalize segregated schools. Part II
explains that the importance of understanding the effect of the
Court's decisions is recognizing that the Court has played a central
role in condemning and then validating segregated schools. It argues
that given the Court's critical role in this history any effective plan to
remedy segregated schools should include an examination of how to
prevent the Court from serving as a roadblock to remedying such
schools while also acknowledging that the judiciary is unlikely to be
the branch of the federal government to remedy separate and
unequal schools in the future. Part III contends that the executive
branch would be the most effective branch to address this issue and
proposes how the executive branch could begin to fulfill Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown 1)'s3 promise to end separate and
unequal schools.36
I. HOW THE COURT MADE SEPARATE SCHOOLS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Part I presents the familiar history of how the Court made
separate and unequal public elementary and secondary schools
unconstitutional. As described below, despite the Court's promising
start in Brown I declaring separate educational facilities "inherently
unequal,"37 the Court's decision in Brown H invited school districts to
33. See Sam Dillon, Education Standards Likely to See Toughening, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 2009, at A12.
34. Id. (noting that the Obama administration's revisions to the No Child Left Behind
Act ("NCLB") will require a toughening of some requirements and that the federal
government will play an increasingly prominent role in shaping education policy across the
country).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Id. at 493-95.
37. Id. at 495.
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delay desegregation. 8 It took the Court more than a decade to
declare an end to the delay that it had invited and to issue decisions
that gave school districts sufficient guidance to understand their
obligation to dismantle segregated schools.3 9
A. Brown I and II and Their Immediate Aftermath
In Brown I, the Supreme Court confronted whether Plessy v.
Ferguson's40 approval of "separate but equal" facilities, 41 which the
Court had extended to public education,42 violated the Equal
Protection Clause.43 While the Court found the history of the Equal
Protection Clause inconclusive on whether racially segregated
educational facilities were unconstitutional, the Court's examination
of the importance of education in training schoolchildren for
professional success, developing good citizens, and instilling cultural
values led the Court to determine that education is "a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms."' Even when the
tangible benefits were the same, racially segregated educational
opportunities denied African American students "equal educational
opportunities" because African American students were denied the
intangible benefits of engaging in learning with their peers, and the
segregation created a sense of inferiority that adversely affected the
mental and educational development of the African American
schoolchildren. 45 The Court unequivocally declared that "in the field
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."46 As a result,
the Court held that separate educational facilities denied the minority
schoolchildren the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection of the laws.47
Given the complexity of the issues at stake, the Court in Brown I
requested further argument on how it should guide the lower courts
as they oversaw the dismantling of segregation.4 Despite the Court's
38. See infra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 110-47 and accompanying text.
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
41. Id. at 550-52.
42. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1927).
43. Brown v. Bd, of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
44. Id. at 493.
45. Id. at 493-94.
46. Id. at 495.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 495-96.
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invitation to delay implementation of Brown I, sizeable cities in
several border states, such as Wilmington, Delaware; Baltimore,
Maryland; and St. Louis, Missouri, and the District of Columbia
began to desegregate shortly after Brown I and did not wait for the
Court to issue a decision in Brown H." However, the Court's decision
to hear further argument on implementation makes it unsurprising
that some states chose not to move forward with desegregation and
instead awaited further guidance from the Court. °
When the Court did address the need to remedy the
constitutional violations identified in Brown I, the Court placed an
affirmative obligation on school districts to take action by directing
school districts to undertake "a prompt and reasonable start toward
full compliance."51 However, the Court simultaneously undermined
this obligation and invited delay in the implementation of Brown I in
several ways. For instance, rather than focusing on the rights of
minority schoolchildren that had been denied for generations, the
Court focused in Brown II on the obstacles and problems that
districts would encounter in implementing its commands.52 The Court
invited school districts to make a case to the district court that they
needed additional time for implementation. 3 Once a school district
had begun to desegregate, courts were given permission to approve of
delays in implementation if a school district needed additional time to
effectively implement the ruling.54 Desegregation need not proceed
expeditiously; instead, districts could proceed "with all deliberate
speed" in admitting minority schoolchildren on a nondiscriminatory
basis.55 Therefore, Brown II made clear that delay would be not
merely tolerated but understandable. 6 The Court's repeated
emphasis on local problems that must be overcome, the "deliberate"
nature of implementation, and the ability of districts to obtain
additional time to desegregate overshadowed the Court's
49. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 345 (2004).
50. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
51. Id. at 300.
52. Id. at 298-300.
53. Id. at 300.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 301.
56. See David Crump, From Freeman to Brown and Back Again: Principle,
Pragmatism, and Proximate Cause in the School Desegregation Decisions, 68 WASH. L.
REV. 753, 764 (1993).
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genuflection toward a "prompt and reasonable start" at desegregation
and to compliance "at the earliest practicable date."57
In addition to countenancing a slow implementation of Brown II,
the Court invited delay in school desegregation in several other ways.
The Court placed those in violation of the Constitution-the school
districts-in charge of developing the remedy.58 This placed those
most invested in forestalling desegregation in charge of
implementation. 9 In addition, although the Court charged federal
judges with overseeing implementation and instructed them to follow
equitable principles, the Court failed to provide judges with clear
guidance on how desegregation should proceed, when districts must
achieve full compliance, and how they should respond when districts
refused to comply.6' The absence of sufficient guidance also left lower
courts to undertake the difficult business of translating the Court's
decisions into a coherent body of constitutional law that defined the
path that districts must follow to achieve desegregation.6
Many school boards, particularly those in the South, were not
inclined to comply with the Court's decisions and faced substantial
political and personal pressure to avoid enforcing the decisions.62
Politically, school board members who disregarded public opposition
to desegregation lost their jobs as well as faced pressure from state
officials who threatened to end state funds or shut down schools if
schools were desegregated.63 Personally, the board members were
required to live within communities that vehemently opposed
desegregation, and many experienced personal hardships, including
57. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300; see also Crump, supra note 56, at 764 ("The
requirement of compliance expressed in such phrases as 'prompt' and 'earliest practicable
date' was contradicted by authorizations of 'additional time' and the emphasis of a
'deliberate' pace. When the result was to happen was left as confused as what the result
was to be." (quoting Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300-01)).
58. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 299 ("Full implementation of these constitutional principles
may require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems ... ").
59. As one scholar observed, "[ulsually, courts do not place the fox in charge of
bringing the hen house into compliance with law." Crump, supra note 56, at 762.
60. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 127 (2004); JAMES T.
PATrERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS
TROUBLED LEGACY 92, 113 (2001); Crump, supra note 56, at 764; James E. Ryan, The
Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 139 (2007) (describing
the message to districts in Brown I and H as "famously ambiguous").
61. Robert L. Carter, Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes-Abstraction or
Reality, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 160, 177-80; Crump, supra note 56, at 762.
62. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 350.
63. Id.
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physical attacks, harassing letters, and cross burnings.64 In Brown II,
these board members found ample legal support for continued delay
in the face of community opposition.65 Given the unpopularity of the
decision, those school board members who did want to comply
needed unequivocal clarity on what was required.66 Instead, they
received a vague Court decision that tolerated evasion.67
Although lifetime tenure offered federal judges some protection
from political reprisals, these federal judges encountered political and
personal pressure not to require desegregation. 8 In addition, the
violence and school closures that accompanied some desegregation
led judges to have few incentives to order desegregation.69 Like
school board members who supported desegregation, federal judges
experienced personal acts of violence, hate mail, and sometimes cross
burnings.7 ° For desegregation to have proceeded after Brown II in the
face of such opposition, the judges needed an unequivocal mandate
from the Supreme Court.7 But Brown H did not provide clear judicial
guidance to these judges.72 Instead, Brown II offered judges the
opportunity to forestall desegregation, as constitutional history and
law professor Michael Klarman has observed,
Even judges who profoundly disagreed with desegregation
might have followed unambiguous Court orders to impose it,
out of a sense of professional obligation.... Brown II, however,
was hardly an order to do anything. Its indeterminacy invited




66. Id.; Crump, supra note 56, at 762.
67. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 350.
68. Id. at 356; OGLETREE, supra note 60, at 127.
69. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 356-57; PATrERSON, supra note 60, at 113.
70. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 356; OGLETREE, supra note 60, at 131; PATTERSON,
supra note 60, at 91.
71. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 355-56; OGLETREE, supra note 60, at 127.
72. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 85 (abr. ed. of FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 2007) ("[In Brown I] [t]he Court
approved gradualism, imposed no deadlines for beginning or completing desegregation,
issued vague guidelines, and entrusted (southern) district judges with broad discretion.");
OGLETREE, supra note 60, at 125 ("Brown II provided no judicial guidance on remedies; it
merely signaled that southern school boards could move gradually, 'with all deliberate
speed.' " (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955))).
73. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 355-56.
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This gradual approach was the price that some Justices imposed
for agreeing to Brown L" Chief Justice Warren indicated that the
phrase "all deliberate speed"75 was adopted because the Court
"realized that under our federal system there were so many blocks
preventing an immediate solution of the thing in reality that the best
we could look for would be a progression of action-and to keep it
going, in a proper manner, we adopted that phrase."76 Some of the
Justices feared injury to the Court if it gave specific and immediate
orders that were not or could not be enforced.77 Additional primary
concerns for the Justices included school closures and violence."
In response to the Court's tentative and vague decision in Brown
II, most of the South waged a campaign of "massive resistance" to the
decision that included almost all of the congressmen and senators
from the South signing a pledge that denounced and pledged to
overturn Brown.7 9 "That Brown II was a mistake from the Court's
perspective was quickly apparent. The justices' conciliatory gesture
inspired defiance, not accommodation. 80 Desegregation typically
required litigation or threats of litigation against school districts,
along with a federal judge who was willing to order desegregation;
however, the lack of necessary funding and commitment required to
pursue litigation and to order desegregation oftentimes left many
communities, particularly in the South, without a way to enforce their
rights.81 In the border states, the North, and the West, desegregation
74. KLARMAN, supra note 72, at 80.
75. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
76. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 747 (Alfred A. Knopf
rev. & expanded ed., 2004).
77. KLARMAN, supra note 72, at 80.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., OGLETREE, supra note 60, at 126, 128-31, 306-07; Peter F. Lau, From the
Periphery to the Center: Clarendon County, South Carolina, Brown, and the Struggle for
Democracy and Equality in America, in FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO THE SUPREME
COURT: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 105, 118-20
(Peter F. Lau ed., 2004) (describing the sustained resistance to desegregation in South
Carolina); Waldo E. Martin Jr., "Stretching Out": Living and Remembering Brown, 1945-
1970, in FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO THE SUPREME COURT: BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra, at 321, 335 ("The ambiguous
implementation decree in Brown Il-to integrate the schools with 'all deliberate speed'-
translated into southern white evasion, avoidance, and outright rejection: in effect,
massive resistance." (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown If), 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955))).
80. KLARMAN,Supra note 72, at 86.
81. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 351-52; Walter G. Stephan, A Brief Historical
Overview of School Desegregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE 3, 17 (Walter G. Stephan & Joe R. Feagin eds., 1980).
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proceeded fairly smoothly in some areas-even though desegregation
oftentimes still took several years-while in other areas in these
regions communities resisted desegregation.82
Given the substantial continuing resistance to school integration
within the South and elsewhere, some view the Court's slow approach
to school desegregation as understandable. 3 On the other hand,
although immediate and total school desegregation in 1955 probably
would have proven elusive had the Court ordered it, the Court could
have established a timetable that established an outer limit for when
desegregation was to be completed, as Thurgood Marshall requested,
or it could have required districts to submit desegregation plans
within ninety days as recommended by the federal government.' 4
Instead, the Court did not give a date by which the schools had to be
desegregated nor did the Court indicate a date by which
desegregation plans had to be submitted. As a result, ten years after
Brown I, less than two percent of Black schoolchildren in the South
attended a desegregated school.86
82. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 345-48; OGLETREE, supra note 60, at 61, 126.
83. For instance, Brown historian Richard Kluger has commented that Brown II
gave the South a great deal more of what it had asked at the final round of
arguments than it gave to the Negro. Yet the Court's implementation decree ...
did not reduce the moral compulsion to end Jim Crow as soon as possible. It
recognized, though, that what is possible in the everyday business of nations is
rarely determined by what Felix Frankfurter called, in the Court's back-room
deliberations over Brown II, "the mere imposition of a distant will."
KLUGER, supra note 76, at 749; see also PAITERSON, supra note 60, at 114-16 (noting
while some contend that Brown I and H inspired a "backlash" against civil rights, most
southern White local leaders were resistant to civil rights for Blacks in the mid-1950s
which makes it unlikely that Brown I or Brown I1 delayed the development "of more
progressive southern race relations in the 1950s").
84. KLUGER, supra note 76, at 748.
85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
86. See KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 349 ("Although by 1963 the increased pace of
desegregation was unmistakable, only 1.06 percent of southern black students yet attended
desegregated schools."); ROSENBERG, supra note 15, at 52 ("Ten years after Brown only
1.2 percent of black schoolchildren in the South attended school with whites."); Martha
Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
599, 617 (2008) ("[B]y 1964, integrated schooling reached only one in eighty-five black
students in the eleven Southern states that had joined the Confederacy during the Civil
War." (citing THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD 378 (Richard Bardolph ed., 1970))).
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B. The Court's Approval of Delay, Evasion, and Token Compliance
with Brown I and II
After Brown I and II, many southern districts adopted measures
that resulted in little or no school desegregation. 7 The Court's
response to such measures was equivocal at best. On the one hand,
the Court made clear that outright defiance would not be tolerated in
cases such as Cooper v. Aaron' in which the Court held that the
implementation of a desegregation plan for Central High School in
Little Rock, Arkansas, could not be suspended because of the
outbreak of violence.89 On the other hand, the Court did not clarify
the nature of school districts' obligation to desegregate until more
than a decade after Brown L"
In addition, the Court's actions and inaction in the interim
further exacerbated the delay that Brown I invited. The prevailing
constitutional interpretation of the obligation in Brown I and II was
that state-imposed segregation was forbidden; therefore, Black and
White schoolchildren must have the option to attend school together,
but further action was not required.9 The Court's failure to denounce
this as the appropriate interpretation of Brown I and H and its
approval of token compliance allowed districts to continue to employ
desegregation plans that accomplished very little or no integration of
the schools.92 For example, southern states adopted pupil placement
plans in each state because such plans ostensibly assigned students
based upon factors other than race, but consistently perpetuated one-
race schools.93 The Court approved of such plans in a summary
affirmance in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education.94 In
addition, over the dissent of three of the Justices, the Court failed to
87. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 325-26, 329-34, 348-49.
88. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
89. Id. at 17; see also Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 44-46 (E.D. La.
1960) (per curiam) (overturning a Louisiana law that gave the legislature the authority to
determine if schools would be racially segregated, gave the governor authority to take
over a school board that a court ordered to desegregate, and authorized the withholding of
funds from integrated schools), affd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
90. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
91. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 358; OGLETREE, supra note 60, at 125.
92. See KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 324, 358 (describing how the Court refused to
grant full review of most cases involving desegregation plans until 1963, which allowed
districts to adopt plans unfavorable to desegregation); OGLETREE, supra note 60, at 127
(describing how Brown H allowed judges to approve desegregation plans that did not set a
deadline for when desegregation had to be completed).
93. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 330-31.
94. 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
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overturn a lower court decision that upheld the Nashville, Tennessee,
plan that desegregated grade-by-grade and that included a minority-
to-majority transfer provision that enabled White students to avoid
attending a predominantly Black school and that encouraged Black
students to leave racially integrated schools.9 5 However, the Court
also refused to overturn a lower court decision that ordered
immediate desegregation for all Black students who wished to attend
integrated schools in Delaware.96
Many school districts also thwarted desegregation by adopting
freedom of choice plans that purported to allow students to attend a
school of their choice but that overwhelmingly maintained the status
quo of racially separate schools.97 Plaintiffs gave the Court several
opportunities to overturn such plans.98 However, the Court did not
overturn freedom of choice plans until its 1968 decision in Green v.
County School Board of New Kent County.99
The Court's equivocation on desegregation was compounded by
its failure to issue clear guidance on the nature of the constitutional
obligation to desegregate. The absence of unambiguous guidance led
judges to waste time trying to convert the Court's decisions into
applicable constitutional legal principles and obligations."0 By
95. Kelley v. Bd. of Educ. of Nashville, 270 F.2d 209, 214-15, 228-30 (6th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959) (Warren, J., Douglas, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting);
KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 331-32; see also Moore v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford County,
152 F. Supp. 114 (D. Md. 1957), affd sub nom., 252 F.2d 291, 291 (4th Cir. 1958) (per
curiam) (allowing to stand a decision that approved a desegregation plan that provided
two years for the desegregation of elementary school students and five years for the
desegregation of high school students and that permitted transfers in the high school
grades), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958).
96. Ennis v. Evans, 281 F.2d 385, 393-94 (3d Cir. 1960), stay denied, 364 U.S. 802
(1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961) (denying a stay and denying review of a decision
that disallowed a grade-by-grade desegregation plan and that ordered immediate
desegregation for all Black students who wished to attend integrated schools).
97. OGLETREE, supra note 60, at 125.
98. For example, the Court denied review of several Fourth Circuit decisions about a
North Carolina law that purported to allow students to request a transfer to another
school despite the fact that these decisions left schools virtually segregated outside of the
handful of selected Black students who were allowed to transfer to formerly White
schools. See Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95, 97-98 (4th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959); Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780, 783 (4th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1959); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 726-27 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
99. 391 U.S. 430, 439-41 (1968).
100. MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 373 (4th ed.
2002); see James J. Fishman & Lawrence Strauss, Endless Journey: Integration and the
Provision of Equal Educational Opportunity in Denver's Public Schools: A Study of Keyes
v. School District No. 1, in JUSTICE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
IN EDUCATION LITIGATION 185, 201 (Barbara Flicker ed., 1990) ("The court made clear
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allowing the principles guiding desegregation to unfold in the district
courts without clear guidance, the Court sanctioned a wide range of
timetables that permitted lower courts to countenance substantial
delay and ineffective remedies."' 1 While the Court issued some per
curiam decisions that forbade such evasive tactics as closing schools
or operating private schools, such decisions lacked any guidance on
the requirements for school desegregation beyond condemning these
practices."° When the Court ultimately issued an opinion on school
closings in 1964, the Court held that Prince Edward County's closing
of the public schools and support of private White schools was
unconstitutional and required "quick and effective" relief for the
plaintiffs; however, the Court did not explain what was required to
establish a school system "without racial discrimination."'' 3 The lack
of guidance coupled with the Court's failure to overturn tactics that
sought to delay and evade desegregation allowed all but a small
percentage of Black and White students to continue to attend racially
separate schools throughout the South in the decade following Brown
I and II.".'
C. The Court Demands Integration in Formerly Intentionally
Segregated Districts
Eventually, a decade or so after Brown I, the Court began to
make clear when desegregation must occur and what compliance with
the Equal Protection Clause entailed. For instance, in the 1965
decision Rogers v. Paul,10 5 the Court found the desegregation plan of
the Fort Smith, Arkansas, school district unconstitutional when the
plan had only desegregated one grade each year, leaving the tenth,
eleventh, and twelfth grades segregated at the time of the Court's
decision.0 6 The Court indicated that delays in school desegregation
in Brown II that its function was to offer general guidance on broad principles of
constitutional law, but it was the responsibility of district courts to apply those principles
to the case at hand.... Instead of specific guidelines, the Court has offered a number of
maxims, which like most generalities, are subject to exception and ad hoc construction.").
101. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 100, at 375.
102. See, e.g., St. Helena Sch. Parish v. Hall, 368 U.S. 515, 515 (1962) (per curiam);
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569, 569 (1961) (per curiam).
103. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1964).
104. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 1954-1978, at 126 (1979) (" 'All deliberate speed' was a
defensible starting point. Yet the Court neglected to monitor deliberate speed, to insist on
more than token progress, or to have done with naked stratagems for evasion and delay."
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955))); see supra note 86.
105. 382 U.S. 198 (1965) (per curiam).
106. Id. at 199.
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were "no longer tolerable," ordered the district court to allow the
plaintiffs to transfer immediately to the White high school with
superior course offerings, and indicated that the high schools in the
district must be desegregated consistent with the recognition that
leaving three high school grades segregated was unconstitutional. 17
However, this-along with one other per curiam decision that
indicated that further delays in school desegregation were
unacceptable' 0 --did not result in school boards taking prompt action
to desegregate, perhaps because the brief per curiam decisions may
not have served as an effective vehicle to convey this important shift
in the Court's approach to these issues."
Instead, it was not until the 1968 decision in Green v. County
School Board of New Kent County" that the Court finally issued a
clear mandate that school districts must immediately desegregate. In
that decision, the Court stated that school boards must "come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now.""' The Court held that districts must
eliminate racial discrimination "root and branch""' 2 and noted that
the obligation of district courts was" 'to render a decree which will so
far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well
as bar like discrimination in the future.' "13 The Court clearly
indicated that a plan that met these requirements must create
integrated schools, stating that the district must "convert promptly to
a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just
schools.""' 4 The Court had hinted in Brown H that it envisioned more
than simply an end to the legal mechanisms that effectuated
segregation when it focused on the obstacles and challenges that
districts would confront in desegregating;"5 such obstacles and
challenges typically would not accompany a repeal of laws requiring
segregation." 6 In Green, the Court finally moved beyond hints and
suggestions of what the Constitution required and unequivocally
107. Id. at 199-200.
108. See Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) (per curiam) ("Delays in
desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable.").
109. STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER:
AN EXPLORATION OF SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES 218 (1977).
110. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
111. Id. at 439.
112. Id. at 438.
113. Id. at 438 n.4 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
114. Id. at 442.
115. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
116. Ryan, supra note 20, at 76.
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demanded integrated schools in those districts that had previously
been intentionally segregated."7
To guide the lower courts in operationalizing these requirements,
the Court identified six facets of districts that must be examined to
determine if school districts were desegregated: student assignment,
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities." 8
In addition, the Court indicated that desegregation plans would be
judged by their effectiveness at dismantling a dual system and pointed
explicitly to the fact that eighty-five percent of Black students still
attended an all-Black school as a key reason for determining that the
challenged plan was unacceptable." 9 The Court in Green, in a
footnote, also recognized that two proposals from the plaintiffs,
school consolidation and neighborhood assignments where residential
segregation did not exist, could serve as possible means to remedy the
constitutional violation and thus began to clarify what tools could be
used to desegregate. 120 Requiring districts to create "just schools" and
premising the Court's approval of neighborhood assignments on the
absence of residential segregation made clear that neighborhood
assignments that resulted in Black and White schools were no longer
tolerable in districts that had intentionally segregated students.
Green is praiseworthy for several reasons. While the Court did
not subsequently clarify which effects of school segregation had to be
reversed or define when a district achieved unitary status,'12 the Court
in Green made clear that the only way that it could determine that
intentional discrimination had been eliminated was for districts to
create integrated schools. 2 2 In addition, the decision undoubtedly
increased the pace of school desegregation. 123 The Court's demand for
immediate integration made clear that further delays were
unacceptable, particularly when the Court reemphasized this point in
117. Id. at 77 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court announced in its 1968 decision in Green v. New
Kent County that formerly segregated school districts must actually integrate their
schools.").
118. Green, 391 U.S. at 435. However, Wendy Parker's research has found that district
courts have oftentimes permitted faculty and staff to remain racially identifiable. See
Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District
Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1650 (2003).
119. Green, 391 U.S. at 437, 441.
120. Id. at 442 n.6; see also WILKINSON, supra note 104, at 117 (noting that the Court's
proposals of potential approaches to desegregation were "novel").
121. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 100, at 380.
122. Green, 391 U.S. at 439-42.
123. WILKINSON, supra note 104, at 126 (commenting that "Green marked the end of
gradualism" in school desegregation but also acknowledging that the decision came "too
late").
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two subsequent decisions.124 The Court's focus on effectiveness also
shifted the attention of lower courts from process to results.125 In
particular, the Court's emphasis on the percentage of Black students
remaining in all-Black schools as an indication of the district's
continued maintenance of a dual system would influence lower courts
to emphasize such statistics in future cases.1 26 This shift in emphasis
removed the burden of desegregation from the backs of
schoolchildren, who under freedom of choice and other plans often
had to choose an integrated school, and instead placed the burden of
creating desegregated schools on school districts. 127 In the aftermath
of Green, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
("HEW") issued hundreds of letters that required changes to
desegregation plans. 128  While HEW's 1965 guidelines for
desegregation informed school districts that the measure of an
appropriate desegregation effort would be "actual integration," the
guidelines focused on the use of "freedom-of-choice plans and the
good faith efforts of local officials. ' 129 After Green, HEW revised its
guidelines to prohibit freedom of choice plans that did not overcome
the vestiges of segregation. 3 °
The Court did not issue guidance on many important
unanswered questions about possible tools to desegregate until
124. See Carter v. W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290, 291 (1970) (per curiam)
(rejecting requests to delay desegregation); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ.,
396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam) ("[C]ontinued operation of segregated schools under a
standard of allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no longer constitutionally
permissible. Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every school district is
to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary
schools." (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954)).
125. WILKINSON, supra note 104, at 116 ("[T]he Court served notice, school plans
would be judged not on paper or promise, but on performance."); Diane Ravitch, The
Evolution of School Desegregation Policy, 1964-1979, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE
CITY 1, 13 (Adam Yarmolinsky et al. eds., 1981).
126. WILKINSON, supra note 104, at 125 ("Green's insistence on statistical evidence
that the duty to desegregate had been accomplished was to become characteristic of urban
school litigation, both South and North."). Some scholars criticize Green for the coercive
plans that followed the decision. See Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III, A Re-
Analysis of the Legal, Political, and Social Landscape of Desegregation from Plessy v.
Ferguson to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 217,230.
127. Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, Desegregation & Federalism, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691,1718 (2004).
128. Gary Orfield, Why It Worked in Dixie: Southern School Desegregation and Its
Implications for the North, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY, supra note 125, at 24,
31.
129. ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS
AND FEDERAL POLICY IN THE POST-BROWN ERA 64 (1986).
130. See id.
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.13' In Swann, the
Court explicitly acknowledged that it had not previously clearly
defined for school districts and courts the obligations of Brown I and
the Court's subsequent requirement to dismantle segregated schools
and create unitary schools "at once."' 32 Instead, the Court admitted in
Swann that the lower courts were left to make sense of its general
pronouncements without any explicit guidance from the Court.'33
In Swann, the Court explained several key points that served to
guide school desegregation. The Court in Swann reviewed the lower
court's approval of a desegregation plan for the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School District in North Carolina.'34 The Court
reminded district courts that they retained broad and flexible
authority to fashion remedies that correct the constitutional violation
of state-imposed public school segregation.' The Court indicated its
approval of school assignment plans that included the use of flexible
ratios of White to Black students as one mechanism for remedying
discriminatory student assignments, 36 while also noting that annual
adjustments of the composition of schools were not required once
discriminatory government action had been eliminated from the
district. 137 Although the existence of one-race schools within a
formerly segregated school system did not by itself establish a
constitutional violation,38 the Court explained that school districts
and federal courts "should make every effort to achieve the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation and will thus necessarily be
concerned with the elimination of one-race schools.' 1 39 The Court
also sanctioned the remedial revision of attendance zones to
eliminate segregated schools." The Court further approved of busing
131. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
132. Id. at 6 ("These cases present us with the problem of defining in more precise
terms than heretofore the scope of the duty of school authorities and district courts in
implementing Brown I and the mandate to eliminate dual systems and establish unitary
systems at once.").
133. Id. ("Meanwhile district courts and courts of appeals have struggled in hundreds
of cases with a multitude and variety of problems under this Court's general directive.").
134. Id. at 10-11.
135. Id. at 15-16. The Court also noted that, even without a constitutional violation,
school authorities may decide in their expertise "that in order to prepare students to live
in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole." Id. at 16.
136. Id; see also United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235-
36 (1969) (sanctioning the use of racial numerical goals for faculty desegregation).
137. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24-25, 31-32.
138. Id. at 26.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 27-28.
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to dismantle a dual system as long as the transportation did not
impair the health or education of the schoolchildren.' The Court's
approval of busing empowered district courts to remedy the racially
separate schools that neighborhood assignments often created as a
result of racially-segregated housing patterns. 42
Like Green, Swann is praiseworthy for several reasons. At last,
the Court supplied much-needed guidance to lower courts on what
tools were acceptable for desegregation, including busing and explicit
racial goals for student enrollment. In the wake of Swann, plans that
required busing were adopted in over 100 southern districts. 43 The
decision also notified districts in the North and West that they must
desegregate.'" Additionally, Swann stated that "[t]he objective today
remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation. 1 45  This inclusion of the term "vestige"
indicated that both segregation and evidence of prior segregation
should be eliminated from school districts.146 Furthermore, like
Green, Swann can be read to reinterpret Brown to not only require an
end to segregated schools but also to establish a right to integrated
schools.
147
Despite the Swann Court's demand for integration and
endorsement of busing, the decision planted the seeds for a return to
racially separate schools. The Court tempered the requirement to
integrate schools by noting that "[tihe constitutional command to
desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every
community must always reflect the racial composition of the school
system as a whole.' 1 48 Furthermore, integrated schools need not be
maintained over time because the Court did not require lower courts
and school boards to make annual adjustments to the racial
composition of schools after the school system had desegregated.1 49
Eventually, the school districts would achieve unitary status and the
141. Id. at 30-31.
142. Ryan, supra note 20, at 77.
143. PATrERSON, supra note 60, at 158.
144. KLUGER, supra note 76, at 763.
145. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
146. See id.
147. Parker, supra note 127, at 1719 ("[In Swann] the Supreme Court had mounted an
attack on continued segregation, not just the consideration of race. Fundamentally, the
Court redefined the right of Brown I to include not just the end of assignment based on
race, but also a right to integration." (internal citation omitted)).
148. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24; see also Ravitch, supra note 125, at 13 (noting this
statement as one of the weaknesses of Swann).
149. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32.
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measures approved in Swann would no longer be necessary. 5 '
Therefore, the Court portrayed desegregation and integrated schools
as a short-term legal requirement rather than a permanent
commitment.'51 Furthermore, the vestiges of segregation that must be
eliminated remained undefined. 5 ' The Court also reminded the lower
courts that "[a]s with any equity case, the nature of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy." '153
The limitations in Swann did not go unnoticed by those opposed
to segregation.'54 Indeed, following the decision, a pro-segregation
editorial in the Richmond Times-Dispatch highlighted many of these
limitations as reasons for "hope for a restoration of sanity and
stability to the pupil assignment systems of the South's public
schools."' 55 In addition, just a few months after Swann was decided,
then-Chief Justice Burger highlighted some of these limitations when
he reviewed a stay application from the Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, School Board.'56 While denying the request to stay
implementation of a desegregation plan for procedural reasons, the
Chief Justice noted that the district court might have mistakenly
believed that it had to obtain a fixed racial ratio throughout the
school system.'57 The Chief Justice also noted that Swann had
indicated that limitations could be set on busing. 5 The Chief Justice's
ruling sent mixed signals to the South.' 59 Later Supreme Court
opinions were able to rely on the limitations in Swann regarding how
long schools must be integrated and on the scope of the remedy to
limit the reach of Swann.'6°
Despite the shortcomings of Green and Swann, together the two
decisions,' 6' along with additional enforcement efforts by HEW and
the Justice Department, were crucial in helping to notify the South
150. Id. at 31.
151. Ryan, supra note 20, at 78.
152. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16.
153. Id. at 16; see also Ravitch, supra note 125, at 13 (acknowledging that this phrase
allowed the Court subsequently to weaken "the integrationist thrust of Swann").
154. See WILKINSON, supra note 104, at 148.
155. Editorial, Beacons of Hope, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 25, 1971, at F6.
156. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1230-31
(1971) (Burger, J., opinion in chamber).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1227.
159. WILKINSON, supra note 104, at 149.
160. Ravitch, supra note 125, at 13.
161. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 27 (2004); James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the
Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2004).
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that desegregation was unavoidable and in sparking a new wave of
court orders requiring desegregation that lasted until the 1970s.162
Green and Swann established a virtually irrebuttable presumption
that existing segregation in schools was caused by prior unlawful
segregation. 63 Interracial contact increased, particularly in the South,
in the aftermath of these decisions and proactive federal
enforcement.1" Nevertheless, some Whites determined to escape
desegregation fled to the suburbs or to private schools.165
Ultimately, the principal shortcoming of Green and Swann is that
the decisions were issued too late to assist the many schoolchildren
educated prior to the decisions who needed clear guidance from the
Court for lower courts and school districts to recognize their rights."6
As this Part has demonstrated, through numerous actions and
inactions, the Court tolerated and even encouraged delays in school
desegregation. Although the Court eventually issued decisions that
clarified the obligations that Brown I and H imposed, Part II reveals
how, shortly after Swann, the Court's decisions began to have the
effect of reconstitutionalizing segregated schools.
II. How THE SUPREME COURT EFFECTIVELY
RECONSTITUTIONALIZED SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
After the Court held in Green and Swann that districts that were
intentionally segregated had to create integrated schools, the Court
issued a series of decisions that had the effect of reconstitutionalizing
separate and inferior schools for minority schoolchildren. This Part
first analyzes how the effect of the Court's decisions was to
reconstitutionalize segregated schools. Sub-Part A considers how the
Court validated desegregation plans that were ineffective in creating
162. See Orfield, supra note 128, at 30.
163. See Frank Goodman, Some Reflections on the Supreme Court and School
Desegregation, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY, supra note 125, at 45, 51; James E.
Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases,
81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1666 (2003).
164. CLOTFELTER, supra note 161, at 26-27; KLUGER, supra note 76, at 763 ("By the
following school year [after Swann] more than 46 percent of the black children in the
southernmost states were attending schools in which the majority of students were white.
No other sector of the nation had achieved anything near that degree of desegregation.");
Minow, supra note 86, at 618.
165. Deborah N. Archer, Moving Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Need for a More
Nuanced Standard of Equal Protection Analysis for K through 12 Integration Programs, 9
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 629, 634 (2007); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and
the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1519 (2005); Ryan,
supra note 161, at 1636-37.
166. See WILKINSON, supra note 104, at 126-27.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
integrated schools in districts that had been intentionally segregated.
Sub-Part B examines how the Court also sanctioned a return to
segregated schools in formerly segregated districts. Sub-Part C then
explores how the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins
served to reconstitutionalize the detrimental effect of segregation on
student achievement. Sub-Part D explains how the Court's failure to
remedy inferior schools further exacerbated those Supreme Court
decisions that had the effect of reconstitutionalizing segregation.
Finally, Sub-Part E analyzes how Parents Involved will further
entrench this effect.
A. The Court's Approval of Ineffective Desegregation Plans
1. The Court Reconstitutionalizes Segregated Schools by Limiting
Interdistrict Remedies
In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken ),167 the Court reviewed a
desegregation plan that was designed to address the lower court's
findings that the Detroit Board of Education and the State had
engaged in intentional discrimination to create and perpetuate
residential segregation and segregated schools.68 The lower courts
determined that an effective remedy could not be developed without
including the suburban districts in the remedy given the increasing
racial isolation in Detroit.169 Therefore, the lower courts approved of
a desegregation plan that included the surrounding suburban
districts.7 ° The in banc court of the Sixth Circuit noted that the State
had committed intentional acts of discrimination and the State
controlled the actions of those needed to remedy the intentional
discrimination. 7' Given those findings, the court decided to include
the neighboring districts in this way:
In the instant case the only feasible desegregation plan involves
the crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit School
District and adjacent or nearby school districts for the limited
purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan. The
power to disregard such artificial barriers is all the more clear
where, as here, the State has been guilty of discrimination
which had the effect of creating and maintaining racial
167. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
168. Id. at 724.
169. Id. at 735.
170. Id. at 722.
171. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 250 (6th Cir. 1973) (in banc), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717
(1974).
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segregation along school district lines.
There exists, however, an even more compelling basis for
the District Court's crossing artificial boundary lines to cure the
State's constitutional violations.... If we hold that school
district boundaries are absolute barriers to a Detroit school
desegregation plan, we would be opening a way to nullify
Brown v. Board of Education .... ."'
Thus, an in banc panel of the Sixth Circuit unequivocally understood
that an effective remedy required the participation of the surrounding
suburban districts and that including these suburbs was appropriate in
light of the State's intentional discrimination and its control over the
suburban districts. Furthermore, the panel recognized that a contrary
decision would render Brown I meaningless.
In spite of this lower court record, the Supreme Court
overturned the interdistrict desegregation plan. The Court held that
the plaintiffs must prove an interdistrict violation of the Constitution
before a court could order an interdistrict remedy because the scope
of the constitutional violation must determine the remedy's scope.'73
This required the plaintiffs to show that any district that was to be
included in an interdistrict remedy had engaged in actions intended to
segregate students between districts. 174 As the lower courts were
focused on addressing discrimination by the State of Michigan and
the Detroit school board rather than by the surrounding suburban
districts, the Supreme Court determined that it was appropriate to
limit the remedy to an intradistrict remedy. 175 Despite the lower court
record that found that an intradistrict remedy would be ineffective,
the Court indicated that an intradistrict remedy would restore the
victims of discrimination "to the position they would have occupied in
the absence of such [discriminatory] conduct." '176 In addition, the
Court also emphasized the importance of local control, which the
Court viewed as preventing the inclusion of the surrounding
districts. 17  Upon remand, the lower courts ordered a variety of
remedial educational programs be implemented in the school district,
and the Court in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I/)178 upheld the
172. Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
173. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744-45.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 746.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 741-44.
178. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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constitutionality of such efforts because they helped to address the
effects of the intentional discrimination that the students had
suffered.'79
Milliken I eliminated the most, and oftentimes the only, effective
desegregation remedy for many minority schoolchildren by removing
the ability to order interdistrict relief. 180 Like the students in Detroit,
most minority students in other northern and western cities were left
without a school desegregation remedy after Milliken I because
desegregation remedies were limited to a single district that lacked
sufficient numbers of White students to desegregate the schools.'18
Data on segregation in metropolitan districts establishes that
segregation within districts decreased from 1970 to 2000 while
interdistrict segregation increased and that currently metropolitan
interdistrict segregation substantially exceeds intradistrict
segregation. 182
Milliken I erected an almost uniformly insurmountable barrier to
interdistrict remedies because proof of action to segregate African
Americans into particular districts was quite difficult to obtain.'83
Since the mid-1940s, African Americans have oftentimes been
concentrated in inner cities and certain neighborhoods within older
suburbs while Whites have increasingly lived in different suburban
179. Id. at 275-79.
180. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1607 (2003); Ryan, supra note 161, at
1645 ("[Ilinterdistrict desegregation was rarely an option after Milliken.").
181. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education
Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1469 (2003); Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the
Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW
AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88,
102 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999) ("After Milliken there was no practical remedy for minority
students concentrated in school districts with few white students; and that describes the
experience of most minority students in the north and west."); Ryan, supra note 161, at
1645 ("The decision dealt a crushing blow to urban desegregation in the North and West,
where school district lines separated urban and suburban schools, and where urban
schools were increasingly dominated by minority students. Unable to include suburban
schools, desegregation plans in urban areas were largely futile, for the simple reason that
there were not enough white students left in public schools."); see also Bradley W.
Joondeph, Skepticism and School Desegregation, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 164 (1998)
(describing how Milliken I prevented meaningful integration of schools).
182. CLOTFELTER, supra note 161, at 64-65, 120. The Milliken I decision also had such
a devastating effect because it offset the interracial interactions that intradistrict
enforcement accomplished. Id. at 67.
183. Ryan, supra note 20, at 82.
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districts."8 Given the effectiveness of housing discrimination at
limiting African Americans' access to much of the suburbs, proof of
discrimination to keep African Americans out of suburban schools
was often lacking because housing discrimination eliminated the need
to change district lines to maintain suburban schools as White
enclaves.185 While many factors have led to housing segregation,
including suburbanization,186 economics, preferences,' and private
discrimination,18 government housing discrimination has played a
substantial role in sustaining housing segregation. 89  Housing
segregation and the preference for assigning students to schools
within their neighborhood have served as the leading causes of racial
isolation in schools. 90 By refusing to view school desegregation as a
necessary remedy for housing discrimination in Milliken I and
elsewhere, the Court erected a jurisprudential wall between the two
issues and a virtual wall between the suburban and inner city school
districts that prevented the Court from effectively addressing
residential or school segregation." The Court's failure to address
housing discrimination led most lower courts to ignore this important
184. Gary Orfield, Foreword to JOSEPH FELDMAN ET AL., STILL SEPARATE, STILL
UNEQUAL: THE LIMITS OF MILLIKEN H'S EDUCATIONAL COMPENSATION REMEDIES 1,
1 (1994).
185. Ryan, supra note 20, at 82; Ryan, supra note 163, at 1666-67.
186. Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION, supra note 1, at 291, 314-15.
187. Id. at 297.
188. Id. at 294.
189. See id. at 297 (describing the importance of the role played by governments in
encouraging residential segregation); Ryan, supra note 20, at 83 (describing the various
factors that lead to residential segregation); cf Thomas F. Pettigrew, Justice Deferred: A
Half Century After Brown v. Board of Education, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 521,527 (2004)
("Racial discrimination in both rental and owner housing markets remains far more
important than economic and preference factors combined.").
190. Ryan, supra note 20, at 83; see Orfield, supra note 186, at 314-15 (describing the
role White flight played in ensuring school segregation).
191. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEi LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR
PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? 34 (2004) ("The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision drawing a line
between city and suburbs for desegregation purposes and the failure to seriously address
housing segregation build severe isolation of children into the life of our metro regions
and mean that even minority families who can afford housing choice often end up in
segregated, poorly-performing schools." (citing Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S.
717 (1974))), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content
_storageI 01/0000019b/80/lb/b8/82.pdf; Pettigrew, supra note 189, at 523 (arguing that, by
disregarding the fact that interdistrict segregation represents the primary type of urban
school segregation, the Court allowed boundaries between predominantly minority cities
and White suburban neighborhoods to "act as racial Berlin Walls."); see also Ryan, supra
note 20, at 83 (noting that the Court also avoided the issue of housing discrimination in
Swann by contending that the Court did not want the school desegregation remedy to
carry too much "baggage").
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contribution to school segregation and, thus, severely undermined the
development of effective school desegregation remedies.'92
Milliken I enabled most suburban school districts located outside
of cities to circumvent desegregation by hiding behind district lines
that exempted them from responsibility for participating in
desegregation plans that would have provided the only opportunity
for effective desegregation for city school districts. 93 The decision
similarly gave Whites the opportunity to escape integrated schools by
fleeing just beyond city school district boundaries.'94 Once Whites
successfully moved out of urban districts and away from their
substantial minority populations, Milliken I ensured that
desegregation remedies would not come knocking at their doors
because of the great difficulty in proving an interdistrict violation.
When many Whites and the suburban districts to which they fled
could sidestep desegregation, integrated schools became an
unattainable dream for minority schoolchildren remaining in urban
school districts.'96 Similarly, suburban districts also could not be
192. See Ryan, supra note 20, at 83.
193. Pettigrew, supra note 189, at 523 ("What makes this [Milliken 1] decision so
regressive is that such remedies are the only means available .... (citations omitted)).
194. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 161, at 67 ("By virtue of Brown ... and the federal
government's enforcement efforts, segregation within districts declined markedly. But
whites who wanted to cushion or avoid the effect of these actions had several means of
doing so. The principal one was to seek out whiter suburban school districts.");
PATTERSON, supra note 60, at 181 (describing White flight to the suburbs of Detroit after
the Milliken decision); Derek W. Black, The Uncertain Future of School Desegregation and
the Importance of Goodwill, Good Sense, and a Misguided Decision, 57 CATH. U. L. REV.
947, 951-52 (2008) ("Milliken signaled to whites that they could avoid desegregation and
build exclusive enclaves by simply moving across the school district line. In that, Milliken
likely exacerbated segregation."); Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 1470 ("Milliken
effectively encouraged white flight to the suburbs. Whites who wish to avoid
desegregation can do so by moving to the suburbs. If Milliken had been decided
differently, one of the incentives for such moves would be eliminated.").
195. See KLUGER, supra note 76, at 767 ("Assured of protection by Milliken from
hordes of African Americans who might otherwise have descended on them by bus, whites
stepped up the pace of their abandonment of the cities."); Charles R. Lawrence III,
Segregation "Misunderstood": The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15, 15-16
(1977) ("The Milliken decision not only assured middle-class whites that their mass exodus
to the suburbs to seek refuge from blacks had not been made in vain, but the Supreme
Court also made clear that they would not use school desegregation to invade the
suburban fortress of housing for whites only." (internal citation omitted)).
196. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 118 ("The social reality ... is that many city
school systems are now primarily comprised of minority students, while surrounding
suburban school districts are almost all white. Thus, effective desegregation requires an
inter-district remedy." (internal citation omitted)); see also supra note 181 (providing
additional sources).
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desegregated because too few minority students lived in thosedistricts."9
When the Court held that the Detroit schools were not required
to implement an effective desegregation plan that turned Black and
White schools into "just schools,"'198 the Court reconstitutionalized
segregated schools for the minority children in Detroit. The Milliken I
Court made constitutional the racially identifiable schools that the
Court had recently declared in Green and Swann must be
eliminated. 99 While the Court alleged that this decision was necessary
because the scope of the constitutional violation must determine the
parameters of the remedy,00 the remedies required by those cases
were not limited by the constitutional violations.2 1 Instead, those
opinions focused on not only remedying the constitutional violation
but also on eradicating the roots of discrimination and on removing
any reminder or trace that the violation had occurred by demanding
that districts eliminate all "vestiges" of discrimination.22 Rather than
eliminate the racial identity of the schools and eliminate the vestiges
of the prior discrimination, Milliken I effectively reconstitutionalized
segregated schools by making an effective remedy dependent upon
proof that the surrounding suburbs had engaged in intentional
discrimination that was extremely difficult to document.2 3
By placing the Court's imprimatur on a remedy that did not
eliminate segregated schools, the Court established that lower courts
also could adopt similarly ineffective desegregation plans.2' The
lower courts received the Court's message loud and clear. After
Milliken I, although some of the existing interdistrict plans were
continued, additional school districts did not choose to adopt
interdistrict desegregation plans because Milliken I established that
197. Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 1469.
198. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
199. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1972) ("The
district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation and will thus necessarily be concerned with the
elimination of one-race schools."); Green, 391 U.S. at 442 ("The Board must be required
to formulate a new plan ... which promise[s] to convert promptly to a system without a
'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools.").
200. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974).
201. Ryan, supra note 20, at 81-82.
202. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15; Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
203. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 745; see also supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text
(describing how it is difficult to obtain proof that suburban school districts engaged in
intentional segregation).
204. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744-48, 752-53 (refusing to allow a desegregation plan
that incorporates surrounding school districts because a cross-district violation did not
exist).
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they were not required to do so. 05 Despite the Court's statement that
it was adopting a remedy that would restore the Detroit schools to the
state of affairs that they would have occupied without
discrimination," 6 the Court in Milliken I failed to analyze how much
integration the students in Detroit would have enjoyed if the State
and district had not engaged in discrimination, including the housing
discrimination found by the lower court.20 7 The Court's failure to
analyze this issue undoubtedly signaled to lower courts that they also
need not undertake such an analysis nor did lower courts need to
develop a clear benchmark for the state of affairs that they sought to
achieve.20 8
Given the effect of the Milliken I decision, it is unsurprising that
many scholars contend that the decision "is significantly responsible
for the segregation of schools in the United States today. 2 9 In fact,
scholars have pointed to the Milliken I decision more than any other
decision as the ruling that allowed many American schools to return
to the "separate but equal" doctrine that Brown I explicitly
eschewed. 210 The Court in Milliken I did not merely allow a return to
205. PATTERSON, supra note 60, at 181.
206. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746.
207. Id. at 728 n.7.
208. See id.
209. Chemerinsky, supra note 180, at 1609. Some scholars argue that Milliken I did not
have the devastating effect that many allege. For example, James Patterson contends that
one cannot conclude that a different outcome in Milliken I would have significantly
altered the educational experiences or relationship between the races in U.S. cities.
PATTERSON, supra note 60, at 181. He contends that the political will in metropolitan
areas was lacking for developing metropolitan-wide solutions to the economic problems
that confronted cities and suburbs that compounded race and class disparities. Id. at 182.
In addition, he argues that while metropolitan desegregation plans might have prevailed in
smaller cities with low concentrations of minority students if Milliken I had been decided
differently, metropolitan desegregation would have encountered severe opposition from
Whites in large cities with majority minority populations. Id. at 182-83. James Ryan
persuasively responds that although "it is impossible to know" if a different decision in
Milliken I would have been resulted in greater metropolitan desegregation, evidence of
successful metropolitan-wide desegregation plans in school districts such as Charlotte-
Mecklenburg suggests that such plans may have proven effective. Ryan, supra note 20, at
83. Such examples provide evidence for rejecting arguments that the Court's decisions
made little difference in school desegregation. See id. at 83-84. In addition, some allege
that where desegregation was ordered it undermined desegregation because it caused
White flight. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 186, at 314-15 (describing the effects of White
flight). Others have argued that cities that adopted metropolitan desegregation plans
experienced less White flight than those districts without such plans. See Pettigrew, supra
note 189, at 526.
210. See, e.g., CLOTFELTER, supra note 161, at 30 ("The year 1974 was surely a turning
point in the federal government's stance on the policy of school desegregation, because in
that year the Supreme Court issued the first of a series of decisions that would effectively
put the brakes on government efforts to desegregate schools."); KLUGER, supra note 76,
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"separate but equal" schools, it reconstitutionalized these schools by
placing the Court's imprimatur on these schools.
The Court decision in Missouri v. Jenkins21' further exacerbated
Milliken I's reconstitutionalization of segregated schools. The federal
district court first entered its remedial order in 1985 to desegregate
the Kansas City, Missouri, school district-more than thirty years
after Brown declared segregation in public education unlawful.212 The
lower courts found that the State intentionally segregated students in
the district and that this discrimination caused White flight and lower
student achievement.2 13 To remedy the constitutional violation, the
lower courts concluded that the district should improve the
educational opportunities provided to the minority students in the
district and attract White students back to the district while
redistributing some of the Whites that remained in the district.214 The
lower courts concluded that an effective remedy was impossible in the
mostly minority school district without an interdistrict approach that
offered magnet schools to attract the mostly White suburban students
back to the district on a voluntary basis. 15 In fact, the Eighth Circuit
went so far as to note that without the magnet schools the
desegregation plan would be "stillborn." '216
at 767 ("Milliken had a quickly chilling effect on whatever hopes remained for a truly
integrated America before the end of the twentieth century."); ORFIELD & LEE, supra
note 1, at 8 ("The Milliken decision could be seen as the return of the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' for urban school children in a society where four of five Americans live in
metropolitan areas."); Brown, supra note 12, at 738 ("Chroniclers of the Supreme Court's
school desegregation jurisprudence would likely point to the five-to-four decision of the
Court in the 1974 case of Milliken v. Bradley as the opinion that effectively ended the
hope of school desegregation for almost all major urban school districts."); Chemerinsky,
supra note 181, at 1470 ("The reality is that in many areas, Milliken means no
desegregation."); Malik Edwards, Footnote Eleven for the New Millennium: Ecological
Perspective Arguments in Support of Compelling Interest, 31 SEATILE U. L. REV. 891, 903
(2008) ("[Milliken I was] the beginning of the end to federal supervision of desegregation
plans."); Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and
Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 290-301 (2005) (arguing that Milliken
effectively stopped school desegregation); James E. Ryan, Scheff, Segregation and School
Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 566 (1999) ("Milliken I made it difficult, if not
impossible, to include suburban districts in desegregation decrees."); Ryan, supra note 60,
at 140 ("Milliken effectively halted the progress of desegregation just a few short years
after the Court became serious about it.").
211. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
212. Id. at 74.
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The plan the court adopted appeared to have avoided the
approach that was invalidated in Milliken I because it did not require
the interdistrict transfer of students. The Supreme Court disagreed
and held that, given its prior limits on interdistrict desegregation in
Milliken I, even attempting to attract voluntary attendance of White
students to the district was an impermissible interdistrict goal in light
of the absence of a proven constitutional violation that caused
students to be racially segregated between neighboring districts.217
The Court overturned the teacher salary increases and programs to
improve the quality of the educational programs in the school system
because they were designed to make the district more attractive to
White students in the surrounding suburbs.21 Echoing Milliken I, the
Court's emphasis on local control in Jenkins219 encouraged district
courts to focus on promptly returning the governance of the school
district to local school board officials rather than on adopting an
effective desegregation plan.22 Thus, the Supreme Court sanctioned a
"stillborn" approach to desegregation that had the effect of
reaffirming Milliken I's reconstitutionalization of segregated schools.
2. The Court Reconstitutionalizes Segregated Schools by Defining
the Achievement of Unitary Status on Effort Rather than Effect
The Court in the 1991 Board of Education of Oklahoma City
Public Schools v. Dowell221 decision shifted the inquiry of district
courts from the effectiveness of a desegregation plan in dismantling
segregated schools to how much effort a district exerted in
implementing a plan.22 The Dowell decision freed school districts
from the obligation in Green and Swann to convert intentionally
segregated schools to integrated schools. 223 As demonstrated below,
the effect of Dowell was to reconstitutionalize segregated schools in
districts that had been found to have engaged in intentional
discrimination.
217. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 94-99.
218. Id. at 99-100.
219. Id. at 98 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I1), 438 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)).
220. Alison Morantz, Money and Choice in Kansas City: Major Investments with
Modest Returns, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 1, at 241,262.
221. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
222. See id. at 249-50.
223. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Sch. Bd., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
(stating the goal is to remove "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation" from public
schools); Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968)
(requiring the school board to develop a plan that results "promptly" in integrated
schools).
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The Court in Brown II unwittingly laid the foundation for the
doctrinal shift from effectiveness to effort when determining unitary
status when the Court instructed district courts to assess whether
district administrators instituted the constitutional requirements of
Brown I in good faith. 24 However, while the Court mentioned the
good faith inquiry in the cases in the 1960s and early 1970s when the
Court pushed districts to stop the dilatory tactics that impeded
desegregation, 2 the Court measured good faith by the effectiveness
of a district's actions in creating integrated schools. 226 For instance,
the Court measured good faith compliance in Green by assessing
whether the board's plan would completely dismantle segregated
schools "at the earliest practicable date" and thereby provide
effective relief.227 In fact, the Court in Green further noted that even
an effective plan alone was not enough to establish good faith
because the availability of a more effective plan could demonstrate
the absence of good faith and required a persuasive justification for
the adoption of a less effective plan.2" The Court in Green also made
clear that it was focused on results rather than effort by defining the
obligation of a school board in dismantling desegregation as "the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert
to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch." 29 The Court also issued a demand for an
immediate and effective desegregation plan that eliminated Black and
White schools and created "just schools. '230 Thus, the Court's inquiry
in Green was not on the subjective intent of the school board or the
amount of effort that they put into desegregating. Instead, the Court
measured good faith by the effectiveness of the desegregation plan
and found good faith lacking if the board did not choose the most
effective plan without a persuasive justification.
Similarly, in Swann, the Court mentioned the good faith inquiry
twice but did not make it the cornerstone of the analysis of
compliance." By failing to focus on the good faith inquiry and how it
224. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294,299 (1955).
225. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 13-15; Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
226. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 ("The objective today remains to eliminate from the
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation."); Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
227. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 437-38.
230. Id. at 442.
231. Swann, 402 U.S. at 12-13. The Court mentioned the good faith inquiry when it
quoted Brown Il's instruction that district courts must assess whether the school board has
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can be satisfied, Swann downplayed the importance of an inquiry into
the good faith of school board members. Rather than focus on good
faith, the Court in Swann again emphasized the effectiveness of a
desegregation plan as the measure of compliance. The Court focused
on effectiveness by defining the objective of school desegregation as
"eliminat[ing] from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation. ' '232 Similarly, in addressing the legality of one-race
schools, school districts and district courts were instructed to
maximize desegregation and thus seek to eliminate such schools.233
The Court also placed a heavy burden on the school district to show
that student assignments to a one-race school did not reflect
discrimination.3
In contrast, the Court in Dowell elevated an analysis of good
faith compliance with desegregation decrees to one of the central
inquiries for district courts to consider when they were determining
unitary status.235 The Court also instructed the district court to assess
"whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to
the extent practicable. ''236 The Court adopted this standard in a case
in which a federal court had found that Oklahoma City had engaged
in intentional segregation of the housing and schools in the city and
that a neighborhood assignment plan was ineffective in desegregating
the district.2 37 To desegregate the district, the district court had
ordered the implementation of a desegregation decree that created
integrated schools by busing Black and White students.238 After
operating under the plan from 1972 to 1984, the school district sought
to implement a neighborhood assignment plan under which many
schools would primarily educate students of one race. 39 Under the
school district's proposed plan, of the sixty-four elementary schools
within Oklahoma City, twenty-two would enroll student bodies that
were more than 90% White and other minorities, eleven of the
schools would enroll more than 90% Black students, and thirty-one of
implemented the desegregation decree in good faith. Id. In addition, it noted that some
"dilatory" actions were impeding the actions of those acting in good faith. See id.
232. Id. at 15.
233. Id. at 26.
234. Id.
235. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991). The
additional inquiry is "whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to
the extent practicable." Id. at 250.
236. Id. at 250.
237. Id. at 240.
238. Id. at 241.
239. Id. at 242-43.
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the schools would be racially mixed. 40 Under this plan, over half of
the Black students in the district would attend schools that were more
than 90% Black.241 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
approval of this plan because of the large number of schools that
would return to being one-race schools.242
In response, the Supreme Court sent the case back to the district
court to determine if the school district had implemented the
desegregation decree in good faith and eliminated the vestiges of its
intentional discrimination "to the extent practicable." '243 Although the
Court failed to define when a school district had been made
"unitary," the Court made clear that if the lower court found that the
school district had met this standard, the court should terminate the
desegregation decree and determine the challenge to the new
neighborhood assignment plan by assessing whether the plaintiffs
could show new allegations of intentional discrimination when they
adopted the plan." Once the school district's plan was upheld and
implemented, the schools resegregated as had been anticipated. 245
By focusing on the good faith efforts of the school board and the
practicability of eliminating segregation, and by remaining silent on
the return to a substantial number of schools that overwhelmingly
educated either Black or White students, the Court freed school
districts from the requirement in Green that districts must implement
an effective desegregation plan that eliminates discrimination "root
and branch, 246 and from the Swann requirements that districts must
"eliminate... all vestiges of state-imposed segregation" and achieve
the "greatest possible degree of actual desegregation .... "247 In place
240. Id. at 242; Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 890 F.2d 1483, 1487
(10th Cir. 1989).
241. Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1510.
242. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 243-44.
243. Id. at 249-50.
244. Id. at 250-51.
245. Joondeph, supra note 18, at 655.
246. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430,438 (1968).
247. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 26 (1971); see Philip
T.K. Daniel & Patrick D. Pauken, The PICS Decision-Academic Freedom v. Federalism:
Consider the Constitutional Implications, 18 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 111, 123
(2008) ("The mandate of Supreme Court precedent before Dowell requiring school
districts to remove all vestiges of past discriminatory practices was overruled.
Subsequently, the Court only required the elimination of discriminatory vestiges to the
extent 'practicable.' " (citing Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
246-47, 249-50 (1991) (internal citations omitted))); Wendy Parker, The Future of School
Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1164-65 (2000) (noting that, despite the ways that
the standard in Dowell is still "an exacting standard," Dowell's emphasis on local control is
remarkably different from prior Supreme Court decisions); Hon. David S. Tatel, Judicial
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of these requirements, the effect of the Court's decision was to
reconstitutionalize segregation by allowing school districts to be
found in compliance with the Constitution if they tried, but ultimately
failed, to create and maintain integrated schools."4 Although this
standard could have been interpreted as a rigorous one because it still
required school districts to eliminate all vestiges of intentional
segregation and districts could not be required to do the
impractical,2 9 the Court's emphasis on subjective intent coupled with
a requirement that a district was only required to desegregate to the
extent practicable viewed desegregation as something that must be
attempted but that could be abandoned if the passage of time
revealed that the plan had proven ineffectiveY0
Once the Court adopted the standard in Dowell and
reconstitutionalized segregation, school districts could be released
from court supervision if they could point to impediments that
prevented their past good faith efforts from achieving their goal. One
study of district court desegregation decisions from 1992 to 2002
found that, in applying the Court's desegregation standards, "district
court judges seem very willing to accept inadequacies in result, even
after decades have passed during the attempt.' '25 1 In addition, the
study found that despite their control over faculty and staff
assignments, district courts in the study oftentimes did not require
school districts to address persistent segregation of faculty and staff
that mirrored the overrepresentation of students within the schools
and that the courts did not assess whether this segregation could be
eliminated. 2  Thus, the Supreme Court's focus on what could
practicably be addressed was used by lower courts as a means to
tolerate even those disparities that could readily be addressed. 3
The Court adopted the Dowell standard while emphasizing the
importance of local control.2 4 The emphasis on local control
exempted defendants from having to address persistent racial
Methodology, Southern School Desegregation, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1071, 1109-10 (2004) (arguing that Dowell "eviscerate[d] several of Green's and Swann's
key principles").
248. See Parker, supra note 247, at 1166-67; Ryan, supra note 163, at 1673-74.
249. See Parker, supra note 247, at 1164-65.
250. See id. at 1166; Ryan, supra note 163, at 1673-74 (noting that the intent of the
Court's instruction in Dowell to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination "to the extent
practicable" is to convey the longevity of the struggles with school desegregation and to
restore local control without regard to the effect of segregation on current conditions).
251. Parker, supra note 118, at 1647.
252. Id. at 1649-50.
253. Id.
254. See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991).
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segregation and expressed a "value choice ' 255 by the Court that the
need to end court-supervised desegregation was paramount 2 6 and
that efforts to desegregate could be abandoned. Lower courts'
acceptance of ineffective results is consistent with lower courts
embracing local control as a paramount goal, and achieving this goal
may have justified their acceptance of persistent educational
disparities. 7
Therefore, Dowell's emphasis on effort and practicability
sanctioned desegregation plans that never fulfilled the requirement to
convert to "just schools." '258 The very schools that had been forbidden
were now constitutionally acceptable. The next sub-Part explains how
the Court effectively reconstitutionalized segregation when it did not
require school districts to fully desegregate at one time.
3. The Court Reconstitutionalizes Segregation by Allowing
Desegregation in a Piecemeal Fashion
The Court effectively reconstitutionalized segregation when it
placed its imprimatur on district courts releasing school districts from
court supervision in a piecemeal fashion. In Freeman v. Pitts, 25 9 the
Supreme Court reviewed a decision in which the Eleventh Circuit
held that a district court should retain jurisdiction over the DeKalb
County, Georgia, school district until it simultaneously obtained
unitary status in the six areas of school operations identified in
Green2 60 for several years.2 61 The Supreme Court disagreed and held
255. Parker, supra note 247, at 1166 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court,
1988 Term Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 57, 73, 100
(1989)).
256. Id. at 1166, 1178 ("The value of local control further validates excusing a
defendant's responsibility. In other words, the need to end oversight over school districts
is a reason to pardon or disregard remaining segregation.").
257. Minow, supra note 86, at 620 (noting that, since the 1991 decision in Dowell,
school boards subject to court-ordered desegregation plans have successfully sought and
obtained an end to judicial oversight); Parker, supra note 118, at 1647. But see Parker,
supra note 247, at 1189-93 (finding in a study of school districts from Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas that Dowell did not influence the number of
school districts that requested or acquired unitary status). The effect of Dowell is typically
viewed in conjunction with the effect of Jenkins and Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1991),
and thus is discussed at the end of the next sub-Part. See infra Part II.C.
258. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968); see
Tatel, supra note 247, at 1115 ("Taken as a whole, Dowell strongly suggested that
regardless of the resurrection of one-race schools, a finding of unitariness would be
justified because the school system had complied with the desegregation order in good
faith and because black students had been exposed to the court-ordered plan for some
period of time.").
259. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
260. Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
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that a district court may release a school district from court oversight
in incremental stages before the school district achieves full
compliance with its constitutional obligation to desegregate. 62 In
allowing the district to be released from court supervision
incrementally, the Court reinstated the district court's determination
that it was appropriate to release the school district from court
supervision over facilities, student assignment, extracurricular
activities, and transportation while it retained authority over the
quality of the education and faculty and staff assignments. 263 The
Court in Freeman echoed the Dowell Court's focus on practicability
by noting approvingly that the lower court found that the
desegregation order "was designed to achieve maximum practicable
desegregation. ' 2' Further echoing Dowell, the Court in Freeman
emphasized that the lower courts should analyze compliance with
past court orders and the need for court supervision in the future
rather than the effectiveness of the school district's efforts to
desegregate the schools. 65 In addition, the Court again heralded the
importance of local control as "the ultimate objective" of courts as
they assessed whether school districts had fulfilled their constitutional
obligations.266
The effect of Freeman was to reconstitutionalize segregation
because the decision exempted school districts from ever instituting a
complete remedy of the constitutional violation.267 Justice Blackmun
captures this concern well in opening his concurring opinion by
stating that "[i]t is almost 38 years since the Court decided Brown
.... In those 38 years the students in DeKalb County, Ga., never
261. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471. The Court identified the six areas of school operations
that must achieve unitary status in Green as student assignment, "faculty, staff,
transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities." Green, 391 U.S. at 435. The Court
in Freeman also upheld the consideration of the quality of the educational programs as an
appropriate consideration for determining unitary status even though this factor was not
included as one of the Green factors. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492; see Parker, supra note 247,
at 1171. While this decision enabled district courts to assess whether vestiges of
discrimination remained in the quality of the educational programs, just three years later
in Jenkins the Court quickly eviscerated this requirement when it removed from
consideration the effect of the quality of the educational programs on student
achievement. See infra text accompanying notes 297-306.
262. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471.
263. Id. at 492.
264. Id. at 493.
265. Id. at 491-92.
266. Id. at 489.
267. Gary Orfield & David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains,
Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J. 759, 765 (1993); Parker, supra note 247, at 1169.
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have attended a desegregated school system even for one day. '268 In
the case of the DeKalb County School System, the district court
declared student assignment unitary despite the fact that thirty-eight
of the ninety-six schools in the district enrolled student bodies that
were eighty percent or more of one race.2 69 The persistent segregation
in the district meant that the majority of African American students
always attended disproportionately African American schools. 27° The
Court permitted this outcome by weakening the presumption that
once unlawful segregation had been established the racial segregation
in the district was attributable to the defendants. 71 In its place, the
Court determined that current segregation could not be attributed to
the defendants if the defendants had instituted desegregation for a
short time or if the defendants could show good faith compliance with
prior court orders. 72 This enabled demographic factors to rebut the
presumption that school districts that had violated the Constitution
caused any continuing segregation.273
As a result of Freeman, lower courts were empowered to
approve of schools that overwhelmingly educated students of one
race, and lower courts relied on the holdings in decisions such as
Freeman as support for ending court-ordered desegregation.274
Furthermore, after student assignment was declared unitary, even
with substantial racial isolation in the schools that had never been
integrated, any efforts to dismantle the other elements of the de jure
system would be implemented within a district in which many schools
were racially identifiable. 275 Therefore, the effect of the Court's
decision in Freeman was to reconstitutionalize segregation because
the decision sanctioned awarding unitary status incrementally despite
268. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
269. Id. at 476-77 (majority opinion).
270. Id. at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
271. Parker, supra note 247, at 1170-71.
272. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 477, 491-92, 496; Parker, supra note 247, at 1170-71.
273. Parker, supra note 247, at 1170-71; Ryan, supra note 163, at 1671.
274. Black, supra note 194, at 952; Parker, supra note 247, at 1171. But see Parker,
supra note 247, at 1187, 1193 (alleging that Freeman had little effect in her study of 192
school districts in six southern states in 2000).
275. See Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of Education
Equity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 186 (2005) ("Much as Brown's
message that 'separate but unequal has no place' has been undermined by present-day
rhetoric that the ruling intended all programs to be color-blind, Green's message to
desegregate in several key areas has been subverted by the Court's incremental 'unitary'
status determinations that Pitts permits." (first quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I),
347 U.S. 483,495 (1954), then Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471)).
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the school district's failure to eliminate Black and White schools and
create "just schools." '276
The contribution of Freeman to the reconstitutionalization of
segregation is further evident in the failure of courts to require the
elimination of segregation in faculty and staff assignments that was
fully within the purview of school districts. In contrast to the
difficulties in maintaining a stable student population, including
managing demographic change and establishing workable bus routes,
a school district does not face such obstacles when desegregating
faculty.277 Nevertheless, one study documented how, when reviewing
whether a school district has desegregated, lower courts have
acknowledged that faculty and staff remained concentrated in schools
in ways that made them racially identifiable, and then the courts
simply excused this remaining vestige of segregation. 278 This trend
transformed the Court's ruling in Freeman that lower courts could
release districts in a piecemeal fashion to an avenue that lower courts
used to label a district constitutional despite the district's failure to
remedy vestiges of discrimination that were undeniably within the
school district's control. The Court's failure to require school districts
to create "just schools" when determining the assignment of faculty
and staff further reveals that the effect of Freeman was to
reconstitutionalize segregation.
Other scholars have frequently noted the combined detrimental
impact of several of the Court's desegregation decisions, particularly
Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins, and contend that together the three
decisions signal that the Supreme Court has abandoned court-ordered
school desegregation and that lower courts should end desegregation
decrees.279 Scholars have further noted that many lower courts read
276. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
277. See Parker, supra note 118, at 1648 ("Difficulties and complications inherently
present in the student assignment area-developing manageable busing routes,
determining tipping points, managing demographic change-are entirely absent." (internal
citations omitted)).
278. Id. at 1649 ("[D]istrict courts have continually recognized the continuing
identifiability of faculty and staff and then excused that continuing vestige of
discrimination.").
279. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 180, at 1618 ("The three cases-Dowell,
Freeman, and Jenkins-together have given a clear signal to lower courts: the time has
come to end desegregation orders, even when the effect could be resegregation.");
Joondeph, supra note 18, at 660-61 ("Jenkins, coming after Dowell and Freeman, cements
this shift in the Court's approach; it fully reveals the Court's de facto abandonment of
court-enforced desegregation."); Ryan, supra note 163, at 1669 ("All three decisions send
unmistakable signals that district courts should begin winding up the process of
desegregation.").
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these decisions broadly and began ending court supervision of
desegregation, sometimes prompted by a motion from the court itself,
and many, if not most, of these school districts quickly abandoned the
tools that they had adopted to integrate the schools.28 The Court's
emphasis on a return to local control also encouraged courts to end
court supervision of school desegregation.sl
However, the Court's decisions did not merely abandon school
desegregation. They had the effect of reconstitutionalizing the
segregation that it had previously condemned. The Court
accomplished this by declaring constitutional those school districts
that failed to implement an effective desegregation plan that created
integrated schools. The Court approved of ineffective desegregation
plans by severely limiting the ability to employ an interdistrict remedy
that provided the only form of effective relief for some districts,
focusing on effort and practicability rather than effectiveness in
implementing a desegregation plan, and approving partial
declarations of unitary status. The next sub-Part explains how the
effect of the Court's decisions was to reconstitutionalize segregation
by sanctioning a return to schools that predominantly educate
students of one race.
B. The Court Validates a Return to Segregated Schools
Some of the Court's leading desegregation decisions also had the
effect of reconstitutionalizing segregation when the Court sanctioned
the implementation of student assignment plans that allowed many
schools to quickly return to primarily educating students of one race
after implementation of a desegregation plan.21 For example, the
280. KLUGER, supra note 76, at 772; Danielle R. Holley, Is Brown Dying? Exploring
the Resegregation Trend in Our Public Schools, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1085, 1104 (2005)
("The district courts' emphasis on local control and minimizing the other interests in these
cases is a clear consequence of the Supreme Court's decisions in Dowell, Freeman, and
Jenkins where the Court prioritized returning school districts to local control."); Molly S.
McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public
Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1341-42 (2004); Parker, supra note 118, at 1628, 1633-
34 (finding in a study of written desegregation decisions from 1992 to 2002 that lower
courts granted all requests for unitary status from local school boards, with the exception
of one decision that granted partial unitary status, consistent with the Court's emphasis on
local control).
281. Joondeph, supra note 18, at 660-61; Ronald Turner, The Voluntary School
Integration Cases and the Contextual Equal Protection Clause, 51 How. L.J. 251, 295-96
(2008).
282. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976)
(holding that a district court could not require a school district to maintain integrated
schools four or five years after the school district implemented a desegregation decree
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effect of the Court's decision in Dowell was to reconstitutionalize
segregation when it chose not to hold the defendants responsible for
the resegregation of more than half of the district's elementary
schools. 2 3 By refusing to label resegregation a vestige of intentional
segregation, the Dowell decision enabled other districts that had
engaged in intentional discrimination to be declared unitary even
when the school district sought to implement a plan that would
restore much of the prior segregation.2" Given the great difficulties in
proving a vestige of discrimination, e.g., what portion of segregation
could be attributed to the defendants, the Court's decision validated a
return to segregated schools by refusing to attribute lingering
disparities to the illegal conduct of the school board.285
The Court's failure to condemn a school district student
assignment plan that returned over half of the elementary schools in
the district to schools that predominantly educated students of one
race must be understood in light of the fact that at the same time the
Court also appeared to accept the contention that the school board
did not plan to return to its former unconstitutional ways that had
intentionally segregated the schools.286 The combined effect of these
actions signaled to lower courts that allowing the schools to
resegregate could not be used as evidence that the school district was
not planning to continue to fulfill its constitutional obligations.287 In
addition, the Court did not suggest an alternative measure for
assessing whether the school district would return to unlawful
practices.288 This approach also had the effect of further validating a
return to segregated schools.
without a showing that the school district violated the court's original decree or that the
school district took further segregative action).
283. See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 242, 249-50
(1991); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 116 (stating that Dowell approved ending a
desegregation order even though doing so would lead to "dramatic resegregation");
Holley, supra note 280, at 1092 (arguing that Dowell played a crucial role in sanctioning
the resegregation of schools).
284. See ERICA FRANKENBERG, CHUNGMEI LEE & GARY ORFIELD, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT (HARVARD), A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 18-19 (2003), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf
(arguing that Dowell offered an interpretation of unitary status that permitted schools to
resegregate and that after the decision many school districts asked courts to end their
desegregation orders).
285. Parker, supra note 118, at 1646-47.
286. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249.
287. See id. at 249-50.
288. Id. at 249.
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The Court's decision in Freeman similarly had the effect of
reconstitutionalizing segregation because it rejected the existence of
any link between the intentional discrimination of the school board in
DeKalb County, Georgia, and the existence of schools that primarily
educated students of one race even though many of the schools within
the district were never integrated.289 Although the school district was
found to still be violating its constitutional obligations, the Supreme
Court enabled the district to implement policies that worsened
existing racial disparities and isolation within the schools as long as
the district did not exhibit new instances of intentional race
discrimination. 290 As a result, the school district was allowed to build a
new school that disproportionately benefited Whites without the
Court being able to review this decision because the school district
had been found unitary in the area of facilities. 291 After Freeman,
school districts that had been found to violate the constitutional rights
of minority schoolchildren could take steps that reestablished schools
which overwhelmingly educated students of one race. As long as the
district had been declared unitary based upon student assignment and
the plaintiffs could not prove new allegations of intentional
discrimination, school boards were free to ignore the placement of
minority students thereafter. 2' Therefore, the effect of the Freeman
decision was to reconstitutionalize segregation because the Court's
decision refused to consider a return to segregated schools a vestige
of discrimination.
The Court laid the foundation for these decisions in Swann when
it stated that federal courts did not have to annually adjust the racial
composition of schools once desegregation was accomplished.293
Undoubtedly, court supervision of school decisions must come to an
end at some point; however, the Court had declared that that point
was when the school district had eliminated all vestiges of its prior
289. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 476-77, 493-94 (1992); see also id. at 509
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[Tihe students in DeKalb County, Ga.,
never have attended a desegregated school system even for one day.").
290. Joondeph, supra note 18, at 657-58.
291. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491-92; Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 1465-66.
292. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 1, at 7 ("A court can end a portion of a desegregation
plan even if the rest of the plan was never implemented. As soon as the court makes that
determination, actions that would have been illegal under the court order, such as creating
a highly segregated neighborhood school system that leaves most whiles [sic] in good
middle class schools and most nonwhites in segregated high poverty schools failing to meet
federal standards, become legal.").
293. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch. Dist., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971).
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intentional segregation of the schools.29 4 Rather than enforce the
requirements from Green and Swann that all vestiges of intentional
discrimination be eliminated and that formerly segregated schools
must be integrated,295 the Court's approach in such cases as Dowell
and Freeman allows a school district that has been declared unitary to
allow schools to resegregate upon termination of court supervision.
Instead of embracing the need to remedy the deeply entrenched
school segregation that had denied minority schoolchildren a high-
quality education for generations, the Court's decisions treated court-
supervised school desegregation as "a form of temporary penance ...
that, once it had been paid, reversion to racially separate schools was
perfectly acceptable as long as it had not been the explicitly
discriminatory intention of local policy-makers." '296 Therefore, the
effect of some of the Court's leading desegregation decisions was to
reconstitutionalize segregation because the segregation that school
districts were required to remedy before they were declared unitary
by judicial fiat was permissible after a declaration of unitary status.
C. The Court's Effective Reconstitutionalization of Segregation's
Adverse Impact on Student Achievement
Although the Court in Swann required all vestiges of segregation
to be eliminated,2" the Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins298 had
the effect of reconstitutionalizing segregation's adverse impact on
student achievement. In Jenkins, the lower courts found that the
State's intentional discrimination caused a reduction in student
achievement. 299 However, when the case reached the Supreme Court,
it instructed the district court, and thus similarly situated lower courts,
to "sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance" on an examination
of the achievement of students within the district as a measure of the
quality of the education programs provided by the district.3" The
Court noted that the district court failed to identify the extent of the
294. Id. at 15, 26; Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 442
(1968); Black, supra note 194, at 953 ("Court-ordered desegregation cannot operate in
perpetuity. At some point, courts must return autonomy to local authorities. This return,
however, is predicated on the elimination of racialized and unequal schools.
Unfortunately, many districts have never fully accomplished this task."); see also supra
notes 145-47 and accompanying text (explaining the holding in Swann).
295. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15, 26; Green, 391 U.S. at 442; see also supra notes 110-14, 145-
47 and accompanying text (explaining the holdings of Green and Swann).
296. KLUGER, supra note 76, at 772.
297. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
298. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
299. Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
300. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101.
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effect that segregation had inflicted upon minority student outcomes
and thus could not quantify how much student achievement was
reduced by segregation.3 1 Given the myriad factors that influence
student achievement, the Court concluded that the district court's
attempt to improve the educational opportunities within Kansas City
until the students reached national achievement norms must be
abandoned to prevent the district court from inappropriately delaying
the return of the school district to local control.30 2
In Jenkins, the Court shifted from applying a prior presumption
that segregation caused any existing disparity absent contrary proof
to an approach that declared a defendant in compliance with the
Constitution unless the plaintiff could isolate what part of the
disparity the defendant caused.30 3 In light of the great difficulty, if not
impossibility, in proving segregation's incremental effect on student
achievement given the myriad factors that influence student
achievement, the Court made segregation's impact on student
achievement constitutionally permissible."° By failing to remand the
case for the lower courts to at least attempt to gather the appropriate
evidence, the Court signaled to lower courts that they should end any
analysis of how segregation adversely affected student achievement
rather than attempt to gather the proper factual record on this issue.
By essentially instructing lower courts to ignore segregation's effects
on student achievement, the Jenkins decision instructed districts to
abandon its past requirement to eliminate the vestiges of
discrimination "root and branch""3 5 and allowed control to be
returned to the school board even if vestiges of segregation still exist
within the district.30 6 Therefore, the effect of the Jenkins decision was
to reconstitutionalize segregation's adverse effect on student
achievement.
D. The Convergence of the Effective Reconstitutionalization of
Segregated Schools and the Failure to Remedy Inferior Schools
Before turning to how acknowledging that the effect of several of
the Court's key desegregation decisions was to reconstitutionalize
301. Id.
302. Id. at 102.
303. Parker, supra note 247, at 1172-73; see Ryan, supra note 163, at 1672-73
(discussing Wendy Parker's analysis of how Jenkins required courts to quantify how much
segregation adversely affected the student achievement of minority schoolchildren).
304. Ryan, supra note 163, at 1673.
305. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 100-01; Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391
U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (ordering districts to eliminate segregation "root and branch").
306. Joondeph, supra note 18, at 653-54.
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segregated schools enhances our understanding of Parents Involved, it
is important to recognize that the Court's decisions in this area
converged with the Court's failure to effectively address the inferior
quality of segregated schools. The remedial educational programs
that the Court approved in Milliken I1 °7 did not equalize the
segregated schools that the Court's decisions in Milliken I, Dowell,
Freeman, and Jenkins sanctioned. 30 In Milliken II, the Court upheld a
desegregation plan for Detroit that included such compensatory
elements as revising the testing procedures, providing additional
professional development for administrators and teachers,
implementing a remedial reading program, and creating counseling
and guidance programs.309 When faced with an inability to create
integrated schools because of the obstacles that Milliken I erected to
interdistrict remedies, Milliken II encouraged many plaintiffs' lawyers
to seek Milliken H remedies rather than busing within a heavily
minority district.31°
However, the Court limited the ability to enact Milliken H
remedies in Jenkins when it limited the availability of remedial
programs to remedy segregation's impact on student achievement and
when it held that such programs could not be used to attract White
students to the district, even on a voluntary basis.31' The Jenkins
decision made clear that the Supreme Court would not uphold efforts
to make racially isolated schools equal by improving the educational
programming in segregated schools and thus effectively abandoned
even a return to Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine.31" This
discouraged lower courts from continuing special programming to
address the lingering effects of segregation.313
Furthermore, research on the implementation of these remedies
found that they "have not evolved as systemic changes to the unequal
opportunity structure Brown sought to eradicate" and instead they
have served as a way for districts to enjoy a meaningless and short-
lived punishment for intentional discrimination.314 For example, in
307. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
308. See supra notes 180-220, 235-50, 259-78 and accompanying text.
309. Milliken I, 433 U.S. at 272, 287-88.
310. Ryan, supra note 20, at 84.
311. See supra notes 211-20, 297-306 and accompanying text.
312. See Eaton & Orfield, supra note 1, at xv.
313. See Susan E. Eaton et al., Still Separate, Still Unequal, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION, supra note 1, at 143, 147 (noting how Jenkins made it more difficult for
school districts to adopt desegregation measures to improve urban schools in order to
attract suburban students).
314. Id. at 145-46.
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Detroit, approximately $238 million was spent on Milliken II
remedies over twelve years.315  However, school officials
acknowledged that, while the Milliken H remedies did result in some
improvement of the educational opportunities within the Detroit
schools, they did not effectively remedy the poor conditions within
the school district.316 Similarly, although in Kansas City during the
Missouri v. Jenkins litigation over $2 billion was spent over twenty-
three years on the district's remedial plan, the district remains racially
isolated, and student achievement in the school district has remained
stagnant or fallen further.317
The results in these cities do not prove that money does not
matter because substantial research demonstrates that money wisely
spent can positively influence student outcomes.318 Instead, these
results are unsurprising, as education law scholar Goodwin Liu has
acknowledged in stating that "[i]t would be remarkable-and
inconsistent with a large body of research-if tangible resources alone
could entirely offset the complex and ineffable consequences of racial
and socioeconomic isolation." '319 Given the inherent limitations of
Milliken II remedies, they were unable to restore those who had been
subject to discrimination to the situation that they would have
enjoyed if they had not experienced intentional discrimination.3 20
Finally, the limited effectiveness of Milliken I remedies to
improve the quality of racially isolated schools could have been
mitigated if the Supreme Court had concluded that the Constitution
315. Id. at 155.
316. Id.
317. JOSHUA M. DUNN, COMPLEX JUSTICE: THE CASE OF MISSOURI V. JENKINS 173-
74, 182 (2008) (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 216 F.3d 720, 733 (8th Cir. 2000) (Beam, J.,
dissenting)).
318. See JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN
DREAM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 55-57 (2003) (identifying several studies that
demonstrate increased funding can lead to a marked improvement in student
performance). While critics point to Kansas City "as proof that there is no correlation
between funding and educational outcome," two scholars have noted that "the primary
focus of KCMSD [Kansas City, Missouri School District] desegregation plan was to
increase desegregation. Therefore, in Jenkins, the court did not target funding on
strategies which may have had a better chance of improving minority outcomes." Preston
C. Green III & Bruce D. Baker, Urban Legends, Desegregation and School Finance: Did
Kansas City Really Prove that Money Doesn't Matter?, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 80, 100
(2006).
319. Goodwin Liu, The Parted Paths of School Desegregation and School Finance
Litigation, 24 LAW & INEQ. 81, 103 (2006); see also Eaton et al., supra note 313, at 178
(concluding that properly designed and effective remedial programs combined with
integration efforts can have a positive effect on educational outcomes).
320. See Eaton et al., supra note 313, at 173.
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forbids disparities in school finance systems that resulted in some
children receiving an inferior education. However, the Court rejected
such arguments in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.32' In that case, the Court considered a challenge to the
Texas school finance system that enabled wealthier school districts to
spend significantly more on education than poorer districts.322 The
plaintiffs argued that the school finance system violated their rights
under the Equal Protection Clause because the system discriminated
against them on the basis of wealth, and it denied schoolchildren from
the poor districts their fundamental right to an education.3 23 The
Court rejected the wealth discrimination challenge because it rejected
poverty as a suspect classification,324 and held that education was not
a fundamental right because education did not find explicit or implicit
protection in the Constitution.325 As Texas was not denying the
plaintiffs an education but instead was employing a funding system
that resulted in school finance disparities, the school finance system
would be reviewed under rational basis review, which it easily
satisfied.326 In addition, among other reasons, federalism cautioned
against the Court recognizing a right that would immediately render
each of the state's school finance systems constitutionally suspect.327
Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that Rodriguez and one other
decision that rejected a challenge to school bus fees328 were critical
decisions that deconstitutionalized school finance disparities because
the decisions failed to apply the Constitution to address "poor,
African American city schools surrounded by wealthy, white
suburban schools spending a great deal more on education. 3 29 This
Article agrees that such decisions deconstitutionalized one aspect of
education because the Court refused to apply the Constitution to
remedy these disparities in educational opportunity. The Court's
refusal to apply the Constitution to school finance disparities stands
in contrast to the Court's clarion call in Brown and subsequent
decisions that segregated schools are unconstitutional and that
321. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
322. Id. at 12-13 (noting that the Edgewood Independent School District with 96%
minority students spent $356 per pupil while the predominantly White Alamo Heights
district spent $594 per pupil).
323. See id. at 19, 29.
324. See id. at 28.
325. See id. at 35-36.
326. See id. at 55.
327. See id. at 55-58.
328. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 461-63 (1988).
329. Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 123.
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integrated schools must be created, and in contrast to subsequent
decisions that validated a failure to dismantle segregated schools or
that sanctioned a swift return to such schools. The Court's effective
reconstitutionalization of segregated schools exacerbated the Court's
deconstitutionalization of school finance disparities330 because the
combined effect of these decisions sanctioned the operation of
separate schools and failed to provide a remedy when a state
provided poor or minority schoolchildren inferior educational
opportunities. While the Court alone does not bear responsibility for
the current pervasive presence of separate and unequal schools, the
convergence of the Court's actions in these cases has substantially
contributed to the deeply entrenched nature of segregation and
inequality in these schools.
E. How Parents Involved Exacerbates the Court's Effective
Reconstitutionalization of Segregated Schools
As noted in the introduction, the Supreme Court's recent 5-4
decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1 found that the use of race in deciding student
assignments in Seattle and Louisville was unconstitutional.33' Some,
including the dissenting justices in Parents Involved, contend that the
majority decision in Parents Involved should be viewed as a departure
from the Court's prior decisions.332 For instance, although courts had
been ordering school districts that were desegregating to consider
race to achieve integration in light of the Court's decisions in Green
and Swann, the Court's decision in Parents Involved prohibits districts
from using these same techniques the instant that the district is
declared unitary.333 In addition, the Court in Swann had sanctioned
the voluntary use of race to achieve integration even if a district had
not been segregated by stating that to do so "as an educational policy
330. See id. at 119-24.
331. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 732-35
(2007).
332. See, e.g., id. at 823-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Ryan, supra note 20, at 88 ("In some
ways, the [Parents Involved] decision is a fairly radical departure from prior cases.");
Wendy Parker, Limiting the Equal Protection Clause Roberts Style, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV.
507, 534-35 (2009) ("This Essay argues that the Roberts' Court is signaling [in Parents
Involved] a very different approach to both Brown and the Equal Protection Clause than
the Rehnquist Court."); Cedric Merlin Powell, The Future of School Integration in
America: A Symposium Summary, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 559, 560 (2008) ("The
decision in Parents Involved-Meredith represents a seminal doctrinal shift-the Court
rejected the collective decisions of the political communities of Louisville and Seattle and
concluded that race was employed unconstitutionally in both desegregation plans.").
333. Ryan, supra note 20, at 88.
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is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities." '334
Although this statement was certainly dicta because the Court in
Swann was addressing the power of federal courts to order
desegregation remedies, it cannot be gainsaid that the Court in Swann
had unequivocally supported the very technique that it found
unconstitutional in Parents Involved.335
Parent's Involved will make it very difficult for districts to
employ the most effective and direct method of creating diverse
schools.336 When many of the Court's prior key decisions are viewed
as decisions that had the effect of reconstitutionalizing segregated
schools, the Court's decision in Parents Involved is consistent with
these past decisions. The Court's past decisions on school
desegregation had placed its imprimatur on a return to separate
schools in districts like Louisville that previously had experienced de
jure segregation. By using race in student assignments to change the
composition of these schools, Louisville was indicating that these
schools still needed to be changed in some way in spite of the Court's
approval. In response, the Court's majority opinion essentially tells
districts to stop changing that which it had previously sanctioned.337 In
this way, Parents Involved exacerbates the Court's past effective
reconstitutionalization of segregated schools by sending a message
that these schools should be left just as they are.
The Parents Involved decision also has been viewed as a
departure from the Court's past decisions because the Court's prior
decisions repeatedly noted the importance of local control in these
matters, while the Court in Parents Involved appears to abandon its
focus on local control by overturning a local democratic decision to
create integrated schools. 3 8 Here, again, understanding the Court's
effective reconstitutionalization of segregated schools sheds light on
how the Court's decision in Parents Involved is consistent with past
decisions. Given the Court's prior affirmation of a return to separate
schools, Parents Involved uncovers how deep the Court's affirmation
of such schools runs. Parents Involved reveals that this affirmation is
sufficiently entrenched that the Court is willing to strike down the
actions of school districts that seek to alter what the Court has
334. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
335. Ryan, supra note 20, at 88.
336. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 285-94.
337. Cf Ryan, supra note 60, at 154 (noting that Parents Involved tells districts and
communities seeking to integrate their schools that creating integrated schools "is wrong,
or at best, distasteful").
338. Ryan, supra note 20, at 89.
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approved even when the school districts are seeking to exercise the
very autonomy that the Court had ostensibly guarded so zealously in
past opinions.339 Therefore, the Parents Involved majority decision
builds upon and worsens, rather than contradicts, the Court's prior
decisions that had the effect of reconstitutionalizing segregated
schools.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR A RENEWED FEDERAL EFFORT TO PROMOTE
DIVERSE SCHOOLS
Understanding the effect of some of the Court's desegregation
decisions reaffirms two important issues that must be addressed when
considering any effort to address the separate and unequal schools
that exist today. First, those who seek to end such schools must
consider how the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, will either
impede or support such efforts. Second, the courts are extremely
unlikely to be the branch that champions a new effort to end separate
schools, and thus a new plan must be developed to achieve this goal.
Because effective reform will not occur if the Court acts as an
obstacle to reform, this Part first proposes how the federal
government could best promote diverse schools and then considers
how the Court might hinder or support such efforts.
A. The Future of the Federal Role in Reducing Racial Isolation in
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools
The federal government has not initiated a nationwide
substantial effort to address racial isolation in schools for several
decades.34 After requiring intentionally segregated districts to create
integrated schools,341 the effect of many of the Supreme Court's
leading desegregation decisions was to reconstitutionalize and
thereby entrench racial isolation in the schools.34 While the
presidential role in elementary and secondary school desegregation
reached its zenith when President Eisenhower sent federal troops to
339. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
489 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991); Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken 11), 418 U.S. 717, 741-44 (1977).
340. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 1, at 6 ("There has been no significant positive
initiative from Congress, the White House or the Courts to desegregate the schools for
more than 30 years.").
341. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("The
objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation."); Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38
(1968) (demanding school boards eliminate discrimination "root and branch").
342. See supra Part II.
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support the desegregation of Little Rock Central High School, 3 most
historians agree that President Eisenhower was not a proponent of
school desegregation,' and school desegregation received lukewarm
support from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson."4 Since the 1960s,
Presidents have either actively opposed school desegregation or paid
little attention to this issue. 46 The enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 combined with a mixed record of enforcement efforts by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") provided
important weapons against segregated schools." 7  Since 1964,
Congress has taken very little action to support integrated schools;3 48
however, Congress did attempt to limit school desegregation when it
passed a statute in 1974-albeit one that had little effect-that
unsuccessfully attempted to prohibit the use of court-ordered busing
that would require a student to attend school outside of her
neighborhood.349
343. PATTERSON, supra note 60, at 81-82.
344. See Lawrence J. McAndrews, Talking the Talk: Bill Clinton and School
Desegregation, 79 INT'L SOC. Sci. REV. 87, 88 (2004) (noting that with limited exceptions
the historical accounts of Eisenhower's involvement with school desegregation portray the
president "as a reluctant follower of events"); Kenneth O'Reilly, Racial Integration: The
Battle General Eisenhower Chose Not to Fight, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Winter 1997-
1998, at 110, 110-12. But see David A. Nichols, "The Showpiece of Our Nation": Dwight D.
Eisenhower and the Desegregation of the District of Columbia, WASH. HIST., Fall-Winter
2004-2005, at 44, 57-58 ("[The day after Brown, Eisenhower] expressed his 'very great
interest' in desegregating the District's schools and ordered the [District] commissioners
to act immediately to develop a plan to make Washington, D.C., a 'model for the
nation.' " (quoting President Dwight Eisenhower)).
345. Dean Kotlowski, With All Deliberate Delay: Kennedy, Johnson, and School
Desegregation, 17 J. POL'Y HIST. 155, 156 (2005) ("[R]egarding civil rights, both JFK and
LBJ preferred to tackle issues such as voting rights and fair employment that they deemed
more politically and legally congenial-and less emotional-than school desegregation.").
346. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 1, at 6, 8 ("Five of the last seven Presidents actively
opposed urban desegregation .... "); Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 111 ("For decades,
no President has addressed the problem of school segregation."); Chemerinsky, supra note
181, at 1462 ("Since the 1960s, no president has devoted any attention to decreasing
segregation or to equalizing school funding.").
347. See YUDOF ET AL., supra note 100, at 375; Lia Epperson, Undercover Power:
Examining the Role of the Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of
School Integration Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 146, 152-61
(2008); Kotlowski, supra note 345, at 174-75 (describing the desegregation guidelines
promulgated by the HEW in the mid-1960s as representing a "compromise" and the
subsequent more stringent guidelines and enforcement efforts by the HEW); McAndrews,
supra note 344, at 90 (" 'The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare never had
adequate staff to monitor Title IV activities ....... (quoting JOSEPH WATRAS, POLITICS,
RACE, AND THE SCHOOLS: RACIAL INTEGRATION, 1954-1974, at 16 (1997))).
348. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 1, at 8 ("[Tihe last significant federal aid for
desegregation was repealed 26 years ago in 1981.").
349. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (2006)); James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political
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The most notable exception to this trend of federal inattention to
school integration has been the federal Magnet Schools Assistance
Program350 which provides approximately $106 million annually to
support schools that are designed to eliminate, reduce or prevent
racial isolation of minority schoolchildren in public elementary and
secondary schools.35 1 The federal government began providing
support for magnet schools in the 1970s and Congress developed the
Magnet Schools Assistance Program in the mid-1980s.35 2 The
Department of Education in fiscal year 2007 provided grants to forty-
one school districts in seventeen states under this program.353 The
most recent data available for magnet schools indicates that magnet
schools educate more than two million students in thirty-one states.354
Approximately 4,000 magnet programs exist in the United States.3 55
Researchers debate the effectiveness of magnet schools at promoting
integration, and the Department of Education in a 2003 report
conceded that the awards that it made to fifty-seven schools from
1998-2001 only modestly advanced the reduction of racial isolation.356
While this congressional and executive branch support for diverse
schools remains modest, the relatively longstanding and mostly
consistent federal support for magnet schools reveals that some-
albeit limited-congressional and executive support remains for a
federal role in promoting diverse schools.
As scholars have considered the future of efforts to create
diverse schools and have focused on which branch of the federal
government could lead such efforts, some have argued that the
Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2054 (2002) (noting that the statute had
little effect on busing because courts still ordered busing to address de jure segregation).
350. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, §§ 5301-5311, 115 Stat.
1425, 180b-07 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 7231-7231j (2006)).
351. See Mark Walsh, Use of Race a Concern for Magnet Schools, EDUC. WK., Oct. 31,
2007, at 8.
352. See ERICA FRANKENBERG & GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECTIPROYECTO DERECHO CIVILES (UCLA), THE FORGOTrEN CHOICE?:
RETHINKING MAGNET SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING LANDSCAPE, A REPORT TO MAGNET
SCHOOLS OF AMERICA 11 (2008), available at http://www.magnet.edu/uploads/File/
theforgottenchoicerethinking-magnet-schools.pdf; Epperson, supra note 347, at 173.
353. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Education, Department Awards $100 Million in
Magnet School Grants (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2007/09/
09272007.html.
354. FRANKENBERG & SIEGEL-HAWLEY, supra note 352, at 6.
355. Walsh, supra note 351, at 8.
356. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 341 (citing research debating the effectiveness of
magnet schools and citing BRUCE CHRISTENSON ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE MAGNET
SCHOOLS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 1998 GRANTEES x-xiii (2003), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/choice/magneteval/finalreport.pdf).
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judiciary is the only branch of the federal government that could
initiate such an effort because the nation simply lacks the political will
to accomplish this goal through the legislative and executive
branches.357 Scholars have proposed a variety of approaches for
addressing the array of shortcomings and limitations in the Supreme
Court's desegregation case law and for using litigation to support
integrated schools.358 This Article agrees with scholars who have
contended that numerous changes in the Court's approach to
desegregation could have enabled the Court to serve as an important
part of federal efforts to desegregate the schools. For example, one
scholar has argued that the Supreme Court should strengthen and
clarify how it defines the right to desegregation, ensure that plaintiffs
receive an effective remedy, and make its remedial goals more
prospective in nature so that courts adopt remedial orders that
prevent discrimination in the present and the future.35 9 Another
scholar has recommended that the Court clarify whether racial
stigma, racial isolation, or the lack of equal educational opportunity
constitutes the violation in desegregation cases to clarify the scope of
what district courts must remedy.3" Others have criticized the Court's
focus on discriminatory intent and intentional discrimination and
have contended that the Court instead should interpret the Equal
357. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 111, 134 ("In my opinion, the simple
reality is that without judicial action equal educational opportunity will never exist.");
McUsic, supra note 280, at 1335 ("Integration is a grand ideal, but conventional wisdom
says that it is politically impossible to integrate schools by race or class.").
358. See, e.g., Black, supra note 194, at 982-84 (arguing that a school assignment plan
which seeks to desegregate based on "race, socioeconomic status, and geographic
isolation" may be constitutional because it promotes equal educational opportunity);
Maurice R. Dyson, De Facto Segregation and Group Blindness: Proposals for Narrow
Tailoring Under a New Viable State Interest in PICS v. Seattle School District, 77 UMKC
L. REV. 697, 712-13 (2009) (using the standards in the NCLB to argue that a substantial
interest exists in reducing the performance gap between low and high achieving students
and that this interest could support the lawful use of race-based measures to remedy this
gap); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Silent Resurrection of Plessy: The Supreme Court's Acquiescence
in the Resegregation of America's Schools, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 51-52
(1999) (arguing that desegregation would be more successful if plaintiffs demonstrate the
effect state-sponsored housing segregation has on school assignment, reduce the Court's
emphasis on local control, and reemphasize the fact that integrated schools provide the
best educational environment for all students); Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and
Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 564-66 (1999)
(arguing that desegregation litigation can be improved if plaintiffs more specifically define
the right at issue and the amount of desegregation to be achieved and focus on eliminating
prospective and current segregation); Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees
and the Elusive Meaning of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 285 (2002) (arguing that
the Court should define more specifically the harms that desegregation seeks to remedy).
359. Parker, supra note 358, at 564-67.
360. Poser, supra note 358, at 284-85.
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Protection Clause to require substantive equality.36' In addition, if the
Court in Parents Involved had not significantly limited the ability of
districts to promote diversity and reduce racial isolation, the Court
could have strengthened the legal and possibly political support for
some existing efforts while encouraging other districts to adopt such
efforts with greater assurance of their legal defensibility.362
While there was a time that changes to the Court's desegregation
decisions might have reversed the effect that the Court's decisions
had in reconstitutionalizing segregation, scholars have acknowledged
that school desegregation litigation is coming to a close.363 Therefore,
in 2010, proposing new judicial standards for school desegregation
would not likely have a substantial impact on racial isolation in
schools today. In addition, many states and districts have turned their
attention from school desegregation to other issues such as
accountability, choice, and funding." As a result, if avoiding the
documented harms of racial isolation and promoting diversity are to
be achieved,3 65 avenues beyond school desegregation litigation must
be explored that would return the attention of the states, school
districts, and schools to the importance of diverse schools.
Before turning to this Article's proposals regarding how to
reinvigorate efforts to create diverse schools, it is worth noting that
some view the end of desegregation litigation and the diminished
attention to racial isolation in schools as support for ending attention
to the diversification of schools and for focusing on improving the
educational opportunities offered in all schools or in schools that
primarily educate minority schoolchildren. 366 For instance, respected
361. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning
and Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 533, 564 (2006); Yousef T. Jabareen, Law, Minority and Transformation: A
Critique and Rethinking of Civil Rights Doctrines, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 513, 561-63
(2006).
362. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 285-94, 360; Ryan, supra note 60, at 155-56.
363. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 318, at 36; Liu, supra note 319,
at 101 ("Fifty years after Brown II, school desegregation-both racial balancing under
Keyes and remedial programs under Milliken 1I-has all but come to an end."); Ryan,
supra note 20, at 86 ("[T]here is no doubt that court-ordered desegregation is in its twilight
phase."). But see Parker, supra note 247, at 1160 ("[Dlespite the forces indicating a desire
to end or the futility of school desegregation litigation, desegregation cases still provide a
strong vehicle for improving equality in our public schools.").
364. Ryan, supra note 60, at 132.
365. See SUSAN EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON
TRIAL 343-45 (2007); Robinson, supra note 6, at 327-36.
366. See, e.g., Dora W. Klein, Beyond Brown v. Board of Education: The Need to
Remedy the Achievement Gap, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 431, 436-37 (2002); Minow, supra note 86,
at 623; Peter Tolsdorf, If Separate, Then at Least Equal: Rethinking Brown v. Board of
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law scholar Derrick Bell has argued that Brown is dead and that it is a
positive development that educators and parents are accepting that
diversity is not an "essential component" of an effective school.367
Similarly, Darnell Weeden contends that, given the substantial
achievement gap, "it is absolutely necessary and proper to 'shift the
national conversation away from ... integration to new education
strategies that deliver more equal education results' in an
environment with zero tolerance for racial discrimination."3" Others
have taken a similar position.369
This Article eschews the arguments that reducing racial isolation
should no longer be a critical component of efforts to promote equal
educational opportunity because scholars have documented
substantial evidence of the harmful impact of racial isolation and the
benefits of integrated school settings. 30 Any effort to guarantee equal
educational opportunity that does not recognize the importance of
minimizing racial isolation in schools will likely fall short of
accomplishing its objectives on a broad scale because some of the
harmful effects of racial isolation will remain, and the benefits of
diverse school settings will prove elusive.37' As a result, this Article
Education and De Facto Public School Segregation, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 669
(2005); Derek Black, Comment, The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest:
Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 924 (2002).
367. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1053, 1064 (2005).
368. L. Darnell Weeden, Employing Race-Neutral Affirmative Action to Create
Educational Diversity While Attacking Socio-Economic Status Discrimination, 19 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 297, 302 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Op-Ed.,
Equal Access to Schools Fails to Equalize Education, USA TODAY, Apr. 29,2004, at All).
369. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 366, at 436-37 ("Today, as many desegregation cases
are coming to an end, the ultimate goal of Brown-the creation of public schools that
prepare all children to succeed in life-can perhaps best be served not by seeking to create
racially balanced schools, but by seeking to eliminate racial disparities in academic
achievement."); Joel B. Teitelbaum, Comment, Issues in School Desegregation: The
Dissolution of a Well-Intentioned Mandate, 79 MARO. L. REV. 347, 373 (1995) ("In an
ideal society, of course, public schools would be both integrated and adequate. When it
becomes clear that that goal is unattainable, however, one of the two elements must give
way. And when one of the two elements has already served as the focal point for change
[integration], but has failed to bring about the desired change, necessity and fairness
require that the other element be given its due regard."); Tolsdorf, supra note 366, at 669
("The practical solution to end the continuing equal protection violation is 'if separate,
then at least equal.' " (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1895) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting))).
370. See, e.g., Frankenberg, supra note 10, at 534; Robinson, supra note 6, at 317; Wells
& Frankenberg, supra note 6, at 179-83.
371. As Richard Kluger has noted:
Underscoring the dilemma for African American schoolchildren ... was the total
absence of evidence that segregated schools, even with better-paid staffing and
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agrees with those who contend that a dual strategy of both ensuring
equitable educational opportunities in minority schools and
promoting diverse schools represents the most effective approach to
ensuring equal educational opportunity.37 2 This dual approach is
particularly important in light of evidence that litigation that has
gained equal funding for minority students has not resulted in
ensuring that these students receive an equal education and that
research shows that "integration is the best, and perhaps only, way to
provide an equal educational opportunity." '373 Simply put, equal
educational opportunity cannot coexist with the substantial racial
isolation that exists in many schools because equal resources cannot
negate the detrimental effect of racial isolation.374 This Article focuses
on how to increase diversity in public schools with the understanding
that as racial isolation decreases, efforts to reduce racial isolation may
lead states and districts to address some of the inferior educational
opportunities provided in racially isolated schools.
Any new proposal to reduce racial isolation in public schools
must recognize that reducing racial isolation no longer remains an
important goal for most districts.375 An effective proposal to increase
school diversity must return school diversity to the agenda of states
and districts that could develop diverse schools if they deliberately
enriched curricula, provide educational opportunities comparable to those at
integrated schools.... Simply put, segregated schools are grim propagators of
America's most persistent social pathology. The pity is that desegregation has
proven, by and large, an effective antidote, yet the nation has been casting it aside
as an inconvenience, with no appreciable protest from the black community.
KLUGER, supra note 76, at 773; see also HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 318, at
51 ("Although academic achievement for poor urban children was never certain to follow
desegregation, it has proved very difficult to achieve without it."). This is not to deny that
some schools with high concentrations of minority students are successful at achieving
effective outcomes. See, e.g., GERARD ROBINSON & EDWIN CHANG, THE COLOR OF
SUCCESS: BLACK STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 1-3 (2008),
available at http://www.publiccharters.org/ffles/publications/NAPCSShadesofSuccessIB.pdf.
However, these schools are applauded because they represent the exception rather than
the norm. Id. at 1.
372. See, e.g., Epperson, supra note 275, at 202 ("The strategy should have been, and
should be today, a dual strategy of seeking both true integration and equality of
resources."); Minow, supra note 86, at 623-24, 638, 646-47 (arguing for policies that
continue to promote integration after Parents Involved while also emphasizing the
importance of opportunities that offer "not just equality but excellence in schooling" for
all students and particularly for majority-minority schools); Black, supra note 366, at 924
(arguing that educational institutions should seek to improve all students' education and
that they should use diversity to improve educational outcomes).
373. McUsic, supra note 280, at 1355.
374. Liu, supra note 319, at 103.
375. Ryan, supra note 60, at 132.
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undertook efforts to create such schools. Therefore, the discussion
below develops and builds on proposals that would create incentives
and requirements for states and districts to revisit this critical issue.
Once states and districts refocus on the importance of decreasing
racial isolation in schools, states and districts can consider a variety of
approaches to create diverse schools.376 Furthermore, the proposals
discussed below are designed to operate at a national level to ensure
that all states and districts reexamine how racial isolation might be
reduced. Therefore, state mechanisms, such as referenda or state case
law, are excluded from this analysis.
Other scholars that have considered how school diversity could
be promoted have recently focused on how the No Child Left Behind
Act ("NCLB") 377 might facilitate the reduction of racial isolation in
schools. Some view the NCLB requirement that those within a
persistently failing school must be provided an opportunity to
transfer3 78 as one avenue that might promote diverse schools because
schools with high concentrations of minority students are being
disproportionately classified as failing under the NCLB.3 79 However,
many have expressed skepticism that the NCLB will help to reduce
racial isolation in schools for several reasons. Only 2.2% of eligible
students have asked to transfer.38 Furthermore, interdistrict transfers
have been hindered by the lack of availability of schools that are not
labeled failing.381 While interdistrict transfers are permitted under the
statute when a district does not make adequate yearly progress, the
receiving school must voluntarily accept the transfer students, and the
state must cover the costs of transportation.382 As the failure to
establish proficiency of any ethnic or minority group can require
sanctions, greater diversity increases the likelihood that a school will
376. See, e.g., Frankenberg, supra note 10, at 578-80; Robinson, supra note 6, at 336;
Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 6, at 186-87.
377. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
378. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E) (2006).
379. See, e.g., Danielle Holley-Walker, Educating at the Crossroads: Parents Involved,
No Child Left Behind and School Choice, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 911, 933, 935 (2008) ("[T]he
NCLB student transfer provision may be a tool for advocates of racially integrated
schools."); Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 795 (2005) ("One other choice mechanism that has the potential
to aid desegregation is a provision in the NCLB that establishes a right for parents of
children who attend schools in need of improvement to transfer their children to better
performing schools.").
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be identified for improvement.3 83 Therefore, receiving schools lack
incentives to accept students because these students may lower the
proficiency scores of the receiving schools.3" Furthermore, the Title I
regulations for the NCLB require a district to obtain modification of
a court-required desegregation plan if the plan would prevent the
district from offering students in schools identified for improvement,
corrective action, or restructuring the opportunity to transfer which
may further limit the ability of school choice to promote diverse
schools.3 85
In light of the end of school desegregation litigation,386 this
Article focuses on ways in which the executive branch could promote
reducing racial isolation in schools apart from school desegregation
litigation, although the effectiveness of some executive action may
require additional funding that can only by authorized by Congress.
Undoubtedly, revisions to existing statutes and new statutes that
address this important issue could be developed and proposed. 387 For
example, given the longstanding support for magnet schools, one
congressional effort that may generate little opposition would be an
expansion of the federal aid available under the Magnet Schools
Assistance Program,388 especially at a time when Congress recently
authorized $100 billion in federal aid to education, which is the single
largest disbursement of federal aid to education.389 If such a
congressional effort was combined with reforms to the Magnet
Schools Assistance Program implemented by the Department of
Education that increased the effectiveness of the program at reducing
racial isolation,390 Congress could help increase district attention to
magnet schools as districts compete for the additional funding.
383. Losen, supra note 1, at 290, 293; James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No
Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 962-63 (2004).
384. Ryan, supra note 383, at 962-63.
385. 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(a), (c) (2008); see also Losen, supra note 1, at 289-90
(explaining that states and school districts are required to pursue modification of a court-
imposed desegregation remedy if the remedy prevented a student transfer authorized by
Title I).
386. See Ryan, supra note 20, at 85 (noting that for over a decade the federal courts
have been lifting desegregation decrees); see also supra note 363 (listing scholars who have
stated that school desegregation has essentially ended).
387. In a future work, I may propose such statutes.
388. FRANKENBERG & SIEGEL-HAWLEY, supra note 352, at 50; Epperson, supra note
347, at 177.
389. Dillon, supra note 28; Letter from Arne Duncan to Governors and Chief State
School Officers, supra note 28, at 1.
390. See FRANKENBERG & SIEGEL-HAWLEY, supra note 352, at 50-51 (recommending
steps that would improve the effectiveness of magnet schools at reducing racial isolation).
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Rather than focus on potential new congressional action to
promote diverse schools, this Article develops steps that could be
taken by the President and the Department of Education because
such steps could be undertaken without new legislation, although the
success of some of these efforts may require financial support from
Congress to be successful as acknowledged below. Any effort to
reinvigorate a federal agenda to promote diverse schools will
undoubtedly provoke substantial opposition,391 and thus it seems that
the most prudent course of action would seek to build upon the
nation's existing laws rather than propose new ones. Therefore, this
Article agrees with those scholars who contend that the executive
branch currently is the most promising branch of the federal
government for pursuing the reduction of racial isolation in public
schools. 39
2
This Article proposes several avenues for executive branch
action that scholars have left unexplored while also suggesting how
some prior proposals might be strengthened. The proposals discussed
below are divided into two sub-Parts: (1) potential action by the
President and (2) potential action by the Department of Education.
By developing an array of actions that the President and the
Department could take, this Article recognizes that the deeply
entrenched nature of racial isolation in American schools demands a
multifaceted attack on this persistent blight on the American
educational landscape.
1. How the President Could Lead the Nation in a Campaign to
Promote Diverse Schools
This Article identifies several ways that the President could
return the reduction of racial isolation in public schools to the
national education agenda. Some will point to the history of recent
presidential neglect or opposition to school desegregation3 93 as
sufficient reason to dismiss consideration of possible future
presidential action on this issue. Despite this historical record, this
Article includes proposals for how the President could promote
reducing racial isolation in schools for several reasons. First, the
391. See HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 318, at 30-31.
392. See, e.g., Epperson, supra note 347, at 173-74; Chinh Q. Le, Advancing the
Integration Agenda Under the Obama Administration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE:
LEGAL AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR RACIALLY INTEGRATED EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH
AND THE NATION (forthcoming 2010); Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated Education and the
Role of the Federal Government, 88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 730 (2010).
393. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
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President may be the critical actor that influences the protection,
destruction, or neglect of civil rights within the United States.394 Thus,
it may be that the lack of sustained presidential attention to this issue
has significantly contributed to the perpetuation of racial isolation in
the nation's schools. Presidential leadership for the development of a
new executive branch agenda to address racial isolation in schools
may be a necessary predicate for effective reform.3 95
While presidential history suggests that significant presidential
action may be unlikely, history sometimes surprises us. No one would
have anticipated that a Republican President would usher in the
greatest federal intrusion into America's public schools through the
NCLB.396 Similarly, the implausibility of an African American
president-in a nation which laid its foundation upon the backs of
millions of African slaves-perhaps should cause greater hesitancy in
dismissing ideas as implausible or impossible.
Given that Barack Obama currently serves as President and he
has only been in office for slightly over a year, it is worth briefly
noting that although his education agenda does not currently include
efforts to reduce racial isolation in schools, it includes an examination
of issues that lay a foundation for including this issue in the future.
For example, President Obama has emphasized the need for a high-
quality education for all students. His inaugural address
acknowledged that "our schools fail too many."397 Evidence
demonstrates that racially isolated schools typically obtain inferior
and substandard outcomes compared to other schools,39 8 and thus
such schools typically fall within the failing schools that the President
has noted need national attention. In his public remarks, he has
acknowledged that "separate and unequal schools" stood in the way
of the American dream, the persistence of a racial achievement gap,
and the need to prepare all Americans with a competitive and
394. KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 185 (2001) ("[P]residential initiative played a decisive role in
broadening the scope of civil rights policies, in a sequence of increasingly effective
presidential responses, which ultimately pulled along both the courts and Congress [from
Reconstruction through the 1965 Voting Rights Act]."); STEVEN A. SHULL, AMERICAN
CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO CLINTON 58 (1999) ("Presidents play a crucial
role in shaping civil rights policy through their messages because only with presidential
support are major and lasting policy changes likely.").
395. MAYER, supra note 394, at 185; SHULL, supra note 394, at 58.
396. Ryan, supra note 383, at 989.
397. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) (transcript available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/).
398. Robinson, supra note 6, at 327-35; Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 6, at 179-83.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
complete education.39 9 Such statements could lay the foundation for
him to address rising racial isolation in the schools.
Although this Article notes how an executive branch agenda to
reduce racial isolation in schools would fit within the Obama
administration's education goals, it is important to note that this
Article is not aimed at any one administration. Instead, it argues that
presidential attention to and action on the issue of reducing racial
isolation in schools must establish a foundation for meaningful
progress on this issue.4" The participation of this office, rather than
any one person serving as President, is the critical component. Only
time will tell whether any President will bring renewed energy,
resources, and attention to finally fulfilling Brown's promise of equal
educational opportunity.
a. The President Should Use the Bully Pulpit to Raise
Awareness Regarding the Harmful Effects of Racial Isolation in
the Nation's Schools
As separate and unequal schools have become an accepted
fixture on the landscape of American education, dismantling the ways
in which the Court made equality optional after Brown I will first
require the nation to understand the harms associated with racial
isolation in schools and the benefits of diverse educational settings.4"1
Research on these issues should not stay within the hallowed halls of
the academy, but instead it must be taken to state policymakers, city
officials, district administrators, teachers, and ultimately families who
399. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Education at the United States Hispanic
Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2009/03/10/obamas-remarks-on-education-2/); see also President Barack Obama,
Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/us/politics/24obama-text.html?_r=l) ("[I]t will be the
goal of this administration to ensure that every child has access to a complete and
competitive education."); President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on
Strengthening America's Education System (Nov. 4, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-strengthening-americas-
education-system) ("Meanwhile, African American and Latino students continue to lag
behind their white classmates-an achievement gap that will ultimately cost us hundreds
of billions of dollars because that's our future workforce.... It's time to make education
America's national mission.").
400. See SHULL, supra note 394, at 58 (noting that presidential messages can
substantially influence national policy on civil rights).
401. For a discussion of these harms and benefits, see Robinson, supra note 6, at 327-
36; Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 6, at 179-83.
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make decisions that shape the racial composition of schools and
neighborhoods. The need for action will remain elusive without a
common and widespread understanding of the cost that the nation is
paying for maintaining separate and unequal schools and the benefits
of diverse schools.4°
Through the use of the bully pulpit403 or what some scholars call
"going public, ''4 4 the President can raise media attention to an issue
and rally public opinion and support regarding a particular issue and
a proposed reform. °5 Scholars have noted that the bully pulpit can be
and has been used successfully to influence public opinion and
congressional action,4 6 although it is, not surprisingly, not always
used successfully, 4" 7  causing some scholars to question its
effectiveness.4 8 Presidents possess a unique ability to garner the
402. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 327-35. See generally THE PRICE WE PAY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION (Clive R.
Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007) (quantifying the various public costs of inadequate
education and recommending possible reforms for America's education system).
403. The term "bully pulpit" refers to the ability of Presidents to advance their policy
goals through speeches and engagement of the press. Brian Gilmore et al., The Nightmare
on Main Street for African-Americans: A Call for a New National Policy Focus on
Homeownership, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 262, 275 (2008) (citing David A.
Crocket, The President as Opposition Leader, 30 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 245, 267
(2000)). President Theodore Roosevelt developed the phrase "bully pulpit." Michael
Barone, A Big Stick: TR's Sure Sense of America Sure Has Much to Tell Us Today, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 25, 2002, at 52, 52.
404. SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP 2 (2d ed. 1993); Andrew W. Barrett, GONE PUBLIC: The Impact of Going
Public on Presidential Legislative Success, 32 AM. POL. RES. 338,338-39 (2004).
405. See David Mervin, The Bully Pulpit, 11, 25 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 19, 19 (1995)
("From his elevated position in the bully pulpit the President can speak to the American
people justifying, explaining and advancing his policies. Provided he has the skill, the
aptitude and the desire he can mobilize public opinion behind his agenda thereby wielding
a formidable weapon against those who would oppose him whether they are in Congress,
the courts, the bureaucracy or the special interests."); Kant Patel, Presidential Rhetoric
and the Strategy of Going Public: President Clinton and the Health Care Reform, J.
HEALTH & SOC. POL'Y, Volume 18, Number 2, at 21, 24 (2003) ("By going public, the
president can use his leadership skills to persuade the American public to support his
policy agenda.") (citation omitted).
406. KERNELL, supra note 404, at 4, 121, 227-28; SHULL, supra note 394, at 57; Barrett,
supra note 404, at 363; Brandice Canes-Wrone, The President's Legislative Influence from
Public Appeals, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 313,326 (2001); Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidential Rhetoric
and the Public Agenda, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 87, 87 (1995).
407. GEORGE C. EDWARDS III & STEPHEN J. WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
POLITICS AND POLICY 115-16 (1994); Barrett, supra note 404, at 364-65; Patel, supra note
405, at 38 ("President Clinton's strategy of going public to generate public support for his
reform proposal was a failure.").
408. See GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, ON DEAF EARS: THE LIMITS OF THE BULLY
PULPIT 241 (2003) (arguing that the bully pulpit is not an effective presidential tool for
changing public opinion); Lee Sigelman & Carol K. Sigelman, Presidential Leadership of
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attention of American society.4°" The bully pulpit may be particularly
important to a successful presidency within the United States given
the limited influence of the political parties and the separation of
powers.41° In the civil rights arena in particular, one scholar has noted
that "Presidents play a crucial role in shaping civil rights policy
through their messages because only with presidential support are
major and lasting policy changes likely. 41 1
To renew federal attention to the importance of developing
diverse schools, the President should use presidential addresses,
particularly those focused on education, to highlight the continuing
importance of the nation completing the unfinished work of Brown
1412 and renewing its commitment to ending separate and unequal
schools. The goal of the presidential addresses would be to raise this
issue to the national consciousness and to set the stage for reform by
encouraging the nation to understand and acknowledge the injustices
of the existing structure. Through the bully pulpit, the President
would need to emphasize the value of diverse schools for all
Americans and would need to overcome the mistaken belief that
hampered the success of school desegregation: "that equality for all
and incorporation of the minority could only be accomplished by
sacrificing individual achievement of the majority. 413
In addition to calling attention to the harms of racial isolation,
benefits of diverse schools, and need to reinvest in efforts to create
diverse schools, the President would need to candidly acknowledge
the considerable time, effort, sacrifice, and resources that creating
diverse schools will require. Before a single policy reform is discussed,
the President should acknowledge the deeply rooted and complex
nature of the problem and the generations of government action and
inaction that have contributed to the current challenges.414 Setting the
stage for a long battle against racial isolation in schools will be
important for reducing expectations that a quick fix or easy solutions
will make a significant contribution to addressing these longstanding
issues.
Public Opinion: From "Benevolent Leader" to "Kiss of Death"?, 7 EXPERIMENTAL
STUDY POL. 1, 16-22 (1981) (finding that an unpopular president can negatively influence
public opinion).
409. Mervin, supra note 405, at 19; William K. Muir, Jr., The Bully Pulpit, 25
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 13, 14 (1995).
410. See Mervin, supra note 405, at 21.
411. SHULL, supra note 394, at 58.
412. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
413. HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 318, at 50-51.
414. See Ryan, supra note 20, at 83.
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In considering some of the disadvantages of using the bully
pulpit, one challenge may be that the President may be unable to
persuade the public of the need for action.4" 5 Calling attention to the
issue also could galvanize opposition.416 In addition, the bully pulpit is
a device that must be used carefully because well-intended symbolism
or rhetoric can backfire and negatively influence public opinion.417
These potential risks must be borne because the lack of government
attention to the harms of racial isolation in schools in recent decades
demands that any significant government action must be preceded by
a foundation that highlights the substantial harms of such learning
environments and that explains the need for change. 418  The
President's involvement in this effort is essential because the
President enjoys a unique ability to address the entire American
public and to attempt to persuade the public that the need for action
outweighs these potential risks.419 Furthermore, a popular President
that is willing to use his popularity to advance a particular issue can
effectively spend some of his popularity to garner support for
sensitive social issues.420
Of course, presidential addresses that merely identify the harms
of the current racial isolation and the need for sustained and
sometimes difficult action to redress these harms would not
accomplish much without adding effective government policies that
seek to accomplish this goal. Instead, new government policies that
tackle these challenging issues must be developed.42' In the next sub-
Parts, this Article explores how the President can establish a
415. EDWARDS, supra note 408, at 241.
416. See id. at 35-36, 153-54, 164 (providing examples of presidents' use of the bully
pulpit inspiring the opposition).
417. For example, at the 1965 commencement for Howard University, President
Johnson sought to support civil rights by stating that "[y]ou do not take a person who for
years had been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race,
and then say, 'You are free to compete with all the others,' and still justly believe that you
have been completely fair." Muir, supra note 409, at 15. However, some have noted that
the metaphor unintentionally created an image of society that is composed of winners and
losers and that the competitors should not stop to help out those who have fallen behind.
See id. at 15.
418. Frankenberg, supra note 10, at 580; Robinson, supra note 6, at 327-36; Wells &
Frankenberg, supra note 6, at 187.
419. Mervin, supra note 405, at 19; Muir, supra note 409, at 14.
420. Michael Bailey, Lee Sigelman & Clyde Wilcox, Presidential Persuasion on Social
Issues: A Two-Way Street?, 56 POL. RES. Q. 49,56 (2003).
421. Muir, supra note 409, at 17 ("[R]eal problems, like racial bigotry and severe
inequality, do not suddenly disappear simply because presidents substitute an affirming
public philosophy for a philosophy of despair. Rhetoric can not go it alone, but must be
joined with government policies to make others' lives better.").
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framework for developing effective government policies to reduce
racial isolation in schools and to promote diverse schools. The next
three sub-Parts proposes some possible government policies that
could help to accomplish this goal.
b. The President Should Issue an Executive Order That Would
Establish His Plan for Developing Government Policies That Will
Help to Promote Diverse Schools
After laying the proper foundation for the need for the nation to
take action to address the harms of racial isolation in schools and to
harness the benefits of diverse schools, the President should move
from rhetoric to action by issuing an executive order422 that
establishes a national agenda for developing new government policies
that will help to achieve these goals. The order would establish a
series of actions to which the President is committing the executive
branch as it develops these policies and the timetable for those
actions. Given the sensitivity of issues of race and student assignment,
the executive order should include a mechanism for engaging public
dialogue about how these difficult issues can be tackled, such as
numerous town hall meetings. In addition, as discussed below, an
executive order that seeks to reduce racial isolation in schools and
promote diversity should establish a commission to study the current
state of racial isolation in schools and to develop policy
recommendations for reducing racial isolation and promoting
diversity, appoint an advisor to spearhead the implementation of the
policy recommendations, and direct the Department of Education to
issue new guidance on the Title VI obligation to address this issue.
Each of these possible actions is discussed separately in sub-Parts
below.
There are several disadvantages that would attend using an
executive order to initiate the development of policy regarding the
harms of racial isolation and the benefits of diverse schools. One of
the principal disadvantages of approaching this issue through an
422. The term "executive order" has been used broadly to refer to a variety of tools at
the disposal of the President. This Article adopts the definition developed by Phillip
Cooper who defined executive orders as "directives issued by the president to officers of
the executive branch, requiring them to take an action, stop a certain type of activity, alter
policy, change management practices, or accept a delegation of authority under which they
will henceforth be responsible for the implementation of law." PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT 16 (2002). Presidents draw the authority to issue executive
orders from their Article II authority to manage the executive branch and use such orders
to accomplish their policy agendas. See HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 51
(2005); SHULL, supra note 394, at 114.
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executive order would be that a subsequent administration could
reverse the policies developed under the order.4 3 This problem
attends to any approach pursued by the executive branch and also
could be a basis for criticizing congressional or judicial action,
although it is undoubtedly more difficult to obtain new legislation or
overturn judicial decisions. If the executive order required a
campaign to educate the public about the harms of racial isolation in
schools and the benefits of diverse schools, the research and
information disseminated through the campaign could not be
withdrawn, although undoubtedly an administration hostile to efforts
to reduce racial isolation could attempt to convince the public that
racially isolated schools do not inflict substantial harms, highlight
successful racially isolated schools, and focus on the importance of
local control as a paramount value for American schools. Even if such
a counteroffensive were launched, an effective initial campaign would
still likely have a lasting effect on the hearts and minds of the
American people.
In addition, executive orders cannot be enforced through private
civil action.4"4 Therefore, if the President declines to follow through
on the executive order, the issue would likely remain dormant. This
issue can be mitigated through the articulation of clear steps that
must be undertaken by other government offices or institutions, such
as a presidential advisor, a commission, or the Department of
Education. Once those actions are identified, they should be
undertaken even if the President's attention is focused on other
matters.
Acting through an executive order instead of through an agency
can focus criticism on the President.425 This issue also can be mitigated
by requiring action by the Department of Education and others such
as a commission or an advisor. Ultimately, however, given how
controversial this issue would undoubtedly be, an initiative to develop
policy that would reduce racial isolation in schools would require
sustained presidential support and attention, even in the face of
significant hostility.
Despite these potential criticisms of an executive order that seeks
to develop an agenda for how the executive branch will help to
reduce the growing racial isolation in schools, this approach would
423. COOPER, supra note 422, at 78.
424. KRENT, supra note 422, at 51-52 (citing In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig.,
627 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
425. COOPER, supra note 422, at 74.
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enjoy numerous advantages over alternative avenues for action. One
crucial advantage of using an executive order for this purpose would
be that Presidents have successfully used such orders in the past to
initiate a broad range of executive action, including establishing
binding and authoritative pronouncements to the executive branch,
directing the development of regulations, initiating policy, delegating
authority to executive branch officers or agencies, and creating,
reorganizing, and eliminating federal agencies. Executive orders
have spearheaded a number of noteworthy and controversial national
policy initiatives.427 For instance, President Truman racially integrated
the military in 1948 by issuing an executive order.428 President
Eisenhower issued an executive order that required the Secretary of
Defense to order the National Guard to take the necessary steps to
desegregate Central High School, along with the other public schools,
in Little Rock, Arkansas.42 9 President Kennedy created the Peace
Corps through an executive order 43° after Congress had failed in its
attempts to establish a similar program for three consecutive years.431
President Johnson issued an executive order that prohibited racial
and national origin discrimination by federal government contractors
and that established the first requirement that federal government
contractors and subcontractors use affirmative action to employ a
nondiscriminatory workforce.432 More recently, President Obama
established the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board,433
the Council on Women and Girls,434 and the White House Office of
Urban Affairs435 through executive orders. In addition, Presidents
have issued numerous executive orders that have addressed education
issues, including the establishment of the U.S. Department of
Education,436 the appointment of presidential advisory commissions
426. Id. at 21-37.
427. WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION 6 (2003). A study of
executive orders from Franklin Roosevelt through William Clinton found that the
presidents issued approximately sixty-eight executive orders per year, with an average of
just more than one on civil rights per year. SHULL, supra note 394, at 120-21.
428. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948).
429. Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. 89-90 (Supp. 1957).
430. Exec. Order No. 10,924, 3 C.F.R. 85-86 (Supp. 1961).
431. HOWELL, supra note 427, at 6.
432. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 167-76 (Supp. 1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2003e n. (2006).
433. Exec. Order No. 13,501, 74 Fed. Reg. 6893 (Feb. 11, 2009).
434. Exec. Order No. 13,506, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,271 (Mar. 16,2009).
435. Exec. Order No. 13,503, 74 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Feb. 24, 2009).
436. Exec. Order No. 12,212, 3 C.F.R. 255 (1981).
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regarding particular subgroups437 or institutions, 38 and the initiation
of new policies on certain subjects.439
Many Presidents have used executive orders on civil rights issues
and oftentimes they have proven effective in implementing
substantial policy changes." While conflict sometimes arises over the
particular use of an executive order, the use of executive orders has
generally received widespread acceptance. 441 As one scholar noted,
"[t]he courts now fully recognize the president's power to issue
executive orders and agreements that concern both foreign and
domestic policy. Indeed, powers of unilateral action have become a
veritable fixture of the American presidency in the modern era."" 2
An executive order that requires the development of government
policies that would reduce racial isolation and promote diversity in
schools would call attention to the need for further action on this
issue. The order also would notify the public that it should anticipate
government action on this issue. Executive orders also are far easier
to enact than the difficult task of moving legislation through Congress
or navigating the administrative process to issue new regulations." 3
437. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,336, 3 C.F.R. 163-65 (2005) (establishing an
"Interagency Working Group on American Indian and Alaska Native Education" to
oversee implementation of the executive order directed to assisting American Indian and
Alaskan Natives meet the standards within the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001); Exec.
Order No. 13,230, 3 C.F.R. 802 (2002), reprinted in 20 U.S.C. § 3411 n. (2006) ("[I]n order
to advance the development of human potential, strengthen the Nation's capacity to
provide high quality education, and increase opportunities for Hispanic Americans to
participate in and benefit from Federal education programs .... There is established ...
the President's Advisory Commission on Educational Excellence for Hispanic
Americans.").
438. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,270, 3 C.F.R. 242 (2003), reprinted in 25 U.S.C.
§ 1801 n. (2006) (establishing "the President's Board of Advisors on Tribal Colleges and
Universities" and "the White House Initiative on Tribal Colleges and Universities");
Exec. Order No. 12,876, 3 C.F.R. 671 (1994) (establishing "the President's Board of
Advisors on Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs)" to advise the
President on the participation of HBCUs in federal programs and on how to improve
private assistance to HBCUs).
439. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,398, 3 C.F.R. 216 (2007) (establishing a "National
Mathematics Advisory Panel" within the Department of Education that will advise the
Secretary of Education and the President regarding effective mathematics instruction);
Exec. Order No. 13,153, 3 C.F.R. 265 (2001), reprinted in 20 U.S.C. § 6301 n. (2006)
(requiring the Secretary of Education to establish a comprehensive strategy to provide
technical and other assistance to school districts and states to aid them in their efforts to
improve student performance in low-performing schools).
440. MAYER, supra note 394, at 182; SHULL, supra note 394, at 117 ("Ford, however, is
the only contemporary president never to issue an executive order relating to civil
rights.").
441. COOPER, supra note 422, at 25.
442. HOWELL, supra note 427, at 21.
443. COOPER, supra note 422, at 17,58.
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Ultimately, these important advantages of enacting an executive
order on this issue outweigh the potential disadvantages.
However, an executive order that establishes an agenda for
developing new policies and approaches for reducing racial isolation
in schools and for promoting diverse schools, like the use of
presidential addresses, would only be a starting point. Two of the key
components that should be included in such an executive order are
noted below.
c. The President Should Establish a Commission to Engage in a
Public Dialogue Regarding the Harmful Effects of Racial
Isolation and to Consider Potential Government Policies to
Promote Diverse Schools
Through an executive order, the President should establish a
commission to study the current state of racial isolation in schools,
how it affects schools, and how racial isolation could and should be
reduced within schools throughout the nation. Scholars have
recognized that presidential commissions can serve a variety of
functions, including gathering and organizing information, educating
the public about a particular issue, and developing policy
recommendations." There is limited scholarship on presidential
commissions." 5 Overall, presidential commissions appear to have a
mixed record, 446  with some questioning the effectiveness of
presidential commissions," 7 while others have noted and documented
444. See DAVID J. FLITNER JR., THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS 16
(1986) (noting the function of presidential commissions is to gather and organize
information and to make recommendations for legislative or social reform); Hugh Davis
Graham, The Ambiguous Legacy of American Presidential Commissions, PUB.
HISTORIAN, spring 1985, at 4, 8 (noting that the purpose of presidential commissions is to
investigate facts and make policy recommendations); Gerald N. Grob, Public Policy and
Mental Illnesses: Jimmy Carter's Presidential Commission on Mental Health, 83 MILBANK
Q. 425, 444 (2005) ("The hope of every modern presidential commission is to turn the
public's attention to an important problem while providing new policy initiatives designed
to mitigate the prevailing difficulties."); Daniel A. Smith, Kevin M. Leyden & Stephen A.
Borrelli, Predicting the Outcomes of Presidential Commissions: Evidence from the Johnson
and Nixon Years, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 269, 270-71 (1998) ("[A]II of these
commissions carry the same presidential mandate: to study and propose policy alternatives
in response to a new and/or particularly difficult public problems.").
445. KENNETH KITTS, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE
POLITICS OF DAMAGE CONTROL 6 (2006); Amy B. Zegart, Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes:
Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential Commissions, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
366, 367 (2004).
446. Graham, supra note 444, at 5.
447. KITTS, supra note 445, at 7; Smith et al., supra note 444, at 282; Zegart, supra note
445, at 366-67.
2010] RESURRECTING THE PROMISE OF BROWN 859
the influence of commissions on public policy."8 For example,
President Carter's Presidential Commission on Mental Health has
been labeled a "successful" commission because, in spite of a subdued
public reception to the report, President Carter supported the
commission's recommendations and sent a message to Congress
accompanied by a draft of a mental health systems act, and Congress
eventually passed legislation on this issue." 9
The President could develop a commission that would gather
information about the extent and effect of racial isolation in schools
and develop policy recommendations for addressing this issue. Such a
commission could serve as a vehicle for educating the public about
the harms of racial isolation in schools and for engaging the public in
a dialogue about the most effective avenues for reform. One
advantage of commissions is that they provide the opportunity to
have a long-term public dialogue about an issue that is run outside of
the White House.45 Given the sensitivity of issues relating to racial
isolation in public schools, a president that decides to tackle this issue
may want to diffuse the controversy of addressing it by having the
focus of public attention outside of the White House. The commission
could conduct a public dialogue to inform the public of the current
system's costs and the gains that may be won through sustained
change. Furthermore, the President could require the commission to
develop recommendations on what Department of Education policies
and programs could better promote the reduction of racial isolation in
the schools.
In addition to sparking dialogue, commission reports have the
ability to spark significant reform. 51 A key example of such a report
from a commission came from President Reagan's National
Commission on Excellence in Education which produced A Nation at
Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform."2 Although history
indicates that President Reagan appointed the Commission to
448. COOPER, supra note 422, at 54 (listing several influential presidential commissions
and noting that such commissions can create significant long-term responses); CARL
MARCY, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS 2 (1945) (stating that the value of commissions
"has long been recognized"); THOMAS R. WOLANIN, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY
COMMISSIONS: TRUMAN TO NIXON 193 (1975) ("Commissions also had a broad and
significant impact as educators of the general public, government officials, the professional
community, and their own members.").
449. Grob, supra note 444, at 444-45.
450. COOPER, supra note 422, at 54-55.
451. Id. at 53-54.
452. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at http://datacenter.spps.org/
sites/2259653e-ffb3-45ba-8fd6-04a024ecf7a4/uploads/SOTWA_Nationat_Risk_1983.pdf.
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support his policy goals of reducing the federal role in education, the
report instead sparked a crisis for American schools by highlighting
the mediocrity of the schools and calling for significant reforms which
ultimately ushered in a substantial expansion in the federal role in
education.453
Commissions also enjoy the advantage of generating their own
recommendations and thus may enjoy greater credibility than
recommendations that solely came from the White House. 454 On such
a sensitive issue as racial isolation in schools, recommendations from
a cross-section of experts would likely be better received than a
presidential directive. To ensure the independence of the
recommendations, the President would need to avoid influencing the
work of the commission and its resulting policy recommendations.
While the President would lose the ability to determine the exact
nature of the recommendations, the added credibility of the
recommendations coming from the commission should help to gain
public support for their implementation.
Furthermore, the new commission should draw upon some of the
lessons learned from past commissions on how to increase
commission effectiveness. For example, a commission can help to
ensure that its report is favorably received by writing a unanimous,
high-quality, and persuasive report; developing well-supported
findings and recommendations; and avoiding criticism of the
President to help garner presidential support. 455 The commission
should avoid one of the challenges that confronted President
Clinton's often-criticized advisory board on race,456 which had a broad
and somewhat vague mandate.457 A commission focused on
establishing a dialogue about and developing policies that would
address racial isolation in schools would be sufficiently clear and
narrow that the commission could recommend specific policy changes
that sought to achieve concrete and measurable results. By taking
lessons from prior commissions, a new commission could seek to join
prior commissions that produced influential reports, generated useful
information that is considered over time, and sparked significant
long-term responses. 58
453. MCGUINN, supra note 24, at 43.
454. See COOPER, supra note 422, at 54.
455. WOLANIN, supra note 448, at 184-85.
456. See Exec. Order No. 13,050,3 C.F.R. 207 (1998); SHULL, supra note 394, at 119.
457. SHULL, supra note 394, at 119-20.
458. See COOPER, supra note 422, at 54 (describing some previous successful
commissions).
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Finally, a presidential commission focused on reducing racial
isolation in schools would have to confront a challenge that all
commissions face. A commission is not a permanent creation and thus
once it issues its report, it typically is disestablished.45 9 However, this
challenge may be addressed by charging the commission with
assisting the Department of Education with developing new policies
that the Department of Education would continue to address after
the commission ceased to exist. Furthermore, as discussed in the next
sub-Part, this challenge also may be overcome by appointing a
presidential advisor that would oversee the commission's work and
that would continue to advise the President on these issues once the
commission has completed its work.
d. The President Should Appoint an Advisor to Lead the
Nation's Efforts to Promote Diversity in Schools
Through an executive order, the President also should appoint an
advisor 41 that would work with the commission as it engages in a
public dialogue and develops recommendations for government
policy about the need for the nation to reduce racial isolation and
promote diversity in schools. The appointment of an advisor to the
President on these issues would serve several purposes. The advisor
would provide a communication link between the commission, the
Department of Education, and the White House. The advisor could
speak on behalf of the President on these issues and participate in
public dialogues initiated by the commission. After the commission
issues its report, the advisor also could make sure that the
Department of Education is following through on any resulting policy
changes or new regulations.
Policy advisors have come under fire recently because the
Obama administration has appointed more than twenty such advisors
and these advisors do not have to be confirmed by the Senate."6
Some question the effectiveness of these advisors.46 Others contend
that the responsibilities of such advisors can remain unclear and
459. WOLANIN, supra note 448, at 157.
460. The media have labeled advisors appointed by the President that are not
confirmed by the Senate as czars. See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher & Brady Dennis, Obama's
Many Policy 'Czars' Draw Ire from Conservatives, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2009, at A6.
461. See, e.g., id.; Howard Kurtz, Team Obama Pushes Back, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/09/AR200910090152l.htm].
462. HAROLD SEIDMAN & ROBERT GILMOUR, POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER:
FROM THE POSITIVE TO THE REGULATORY STATE 242 (4th ed. 1986) ("[A] 'super
Cabinet' officer without political influence or statutory powers would have nothing going
for him but the majesty of his title, unless he were accepted as the president's alter ego.").
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create tension with administrative agencies if the advisor's
responsibilities overlap with an agency.463 However, a serious
constitutional challenge to the use of such advisors has not been
mounted. Given the fact that efforts to reduce racial isolation in
schools would need to be sustained over a long period of time, such
an advisor would serve as a critical mechanism for establishing
ongoing attention to this issue within the White House. The executive
order should delineate the responsibilities of the advisor so that his or
her responsibilities complement rather than conflict with those of the
commission and the Department of Education.
The aforementioned presidential actions would establish a
necessary foundation for any action by the Department of Education
that seeks to address the increasing racial isolation in public schools.
Without such a foundation, any Department of Education efforts
could meet surprise, stonewalling, and outright hostility. This Article
now turns to proposals for Department of Education action that
would promote diversity and reduce racial isolation in schools.
2. How the Department of Education Could Guide States and
Districts to Promote Diversity in Schools
In addition to recommending presidential action to promote
reducing racial isolation in schools, this Article also develops
approaches that the Department of Education ("the Department")
should take that would lead states and districts to develop new ways
to reduce racial isolation in schools. This sub-Part addresses how
enforcement of the disparate impact regulations under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act could be used to advance efforts to promote diverse
schools. Any action by the Department or the Office for Civil Rights
("OCR") would build upon the foundation that presidential action
would establish.
a. The Need for New Title VI Guidance on Remedying Racial
Isolation in Schools
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the
basis of race, color, or national origin,' represents the critical tool
that the Department can employ to address discrimination and issues
of race in education. In addition to prohibiting intentional
463. See John M. Broder & Charlie Savage, Title, but Unclear Power, for a New
Climate Czar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A28.
464. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
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discrimination, under the Title VI regulations for the Department, a
recipient of federal financial assistance may not "utilize criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national
origin...."I' As one scholar has noted,
Title VI disparate impact regulations have been used to provide
positive and negative injunctive relief in challenges to tracking,
discipline, special education over-representation, and resource
disparities. As a result Title VI remedies can require major
changes in policy and practice designed to increase educational
opportunities for minority students, as well as safeguards
against segregative special education placements, unfair
discipline, and other problems that would not necessarily
register in achievement data.466
Title VI has been used to require education reforms that increase
educational opportunities for minority students.467
The OCR should employ its authority under Title VI to promote
the reduction of racial isolation in schools. First, the Department of
Education should issue guidance on the permissibility of using race-
neutral approaches to reduce racial isolation under Title VI.46 The
Court's decision in Parents Involved will encourage districts to adopt
race-neutral approaches to reducing racial isolation because the
Court's decision will make it difficult for school districts to adopt
race-based student assignment plans that will survive strict scrutiny.46 9
While the OCR issued a report that heralded race-neutral efforts to
promoting diversity,470 there remains an open question of whether
such efforts will be reviewed under rational basis review because they
do not use a suspect criteria or strict scrutiny because they have a
racially discriminatory purpose.47' Given the legal uncertainty of such
efforts, the OCR should issue guidance that unequivocally gives
school districts wide latitude to adopt race-neutral efforts to promote
465. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2009).
466. Losen, supra note 1, at 283 (internal citations omitted).
467. Id.
468. In recommending this guidance, I agree with Epperson, supra note 347, at 177, but
I propose a different approach for what this guidance should contain.
469. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 285-94.
470. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ACHIEVING DIVERSITY:
RACE NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (2004),
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content-storage-0/0000019b/80/lb/b
1/3f.pdf.
471. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 294-97 (describing the Court's mixed signals about
the legality of race-neutral efforts and the debate among scholars about such efforts).
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diverse schools under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act because such
efforts help to ensure that federal funds are not used to promote
discrimination while they avoid some of the harms of racial
classifications. 72 Such guidance would reassure districts that seek to
adopt such measures that they can adopt them without facing
enforcement action from the OCR.473
In addition to issuing guidance that explains that districts may
adopt race-neutral approaches to reducing racial isolation, the OCR
also should issue guidance that establishes that a recipient of federal
financial assistance may violate the disparate impact regulations if it
fails to address racial isolation that imposes a racially disparate
impact. To establish a disparate impact claim for subjecting
individuals to discrimination, a plaintiff must establish that a neutral
practice imposes a "racially disproportionate effect." '474 If the plaintiff
carries this burden, then the defendant must establish an "educational
necessity" for the practice.475 A plaintiff may prevail if he or she can
establish that an alternative practice is equally effective and inflicts
less of a racially disproportionate effect or demonstrate that the
practice is a discriminatory pretext.476 The Supreme Court ruled in
Alexander v. Sandoval477 that plaintiffs may not directly enforce the
disparate impact regulations in court because § 602, the Section of
Title VI that the agencies relied upon to create disparate impact
regulations, did not create individual rights.478 The Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on the split within the federal courts over whether
plaintiffs may enforce the Title VI disparate impact regulations
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983."' 9 Therefore, the OCR is currently the only
472. Cf id. at 351-60 (arguing that school districts should enjoy the freedom to adopt
race-neutral student assignment plans and that courts should apply rational basis review
for the constitutional analysis of benign plans because such efforts advance the purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause while minimizing some of the harms of racial classifications).
473. Also, courts typically will accord the OCR's reasonable interpretation of Title VI
substantial deference. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S.
116, 125 (1985); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
474. Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417
(11th Cir. 1985).
475. Id. at 1417-18.
476. Id. at 1417.
477. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
478. Id. at 293.
479. Compare, e.g., Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003)
(affirming the rejection of a Title VI disparate impact claim under § 1983), and South
Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that a Title VI disparate impact claim could not be enforced through § 1983), with
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enforcement avenue available to all individuals who allege that a
policy or practice has a disparate impact.
In issuing guidance that requires recipients of federal financial
assistance to address racial isolation in schools that impose a racially
disparate impact, the OCR would need to remind states and districts
of their obligation under Title VI to remedy discrimination that
inflicts a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, and national
origin. The Clinton administration took action that reminded
recipients of federal financial assistance of this obligation at the end
of the administration when then-Secretary of Education Richard
Riley sent a letter to all chief state school officers that called to their
attention "long-standing racial and ethnic disparities in the
distribution of educational resources."4 '° The letter noted ethnic and
racial disparities in such educational resources as funding, qualified
teachers, instructional support, and programs and facilities.4 81
Secretary Riley explained that not only do these disparities prevent
the nation's schoolchildren from reaching their full potential, but he
also stated that "[i]n some cases, these disparities may ... raise legal
concerns under our nation's civil rights laws" and specifically noted
the obligation to ensure nondiscrimination under Title VI.' He
concluded by encouraging states to examine disparities in educational
opportunity and to work with education policymakers within the state
to determine how the state can address these issues.4 Therefore, the
Clinton administration reminded recipients that Title VI and its
implementing regulations impose an ongoing obligation for recipients
of federal financial assistance to remedy disparate impact
discrimination and suggested that states may be overlooking some of
the issues that the regulations address.
The OCR would need to clearly articulate what action recipients
that have racially isolated schools must take to reduce racial isolation
to comply with the disparate impact regulation. In developing
language that defines the nature of the obligation to remedy racial
isolation, the OCR should assess any recommendations of the
commission that analyze how to balance the need to remedy racial
isolation in schools with the interests of states and school districts in
Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002) (permitting enforcement of a
disparate impact claim through § 1983).
480. Letter from Richard W. Riley, Sec'y of Educ., to Chief State School Officers (Jan.
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establishing attendance patterns that promote stability and parental
involvement and satisfaction. The OCR could choose to reinvigorate
the Court's requirements in Swann to integrate schools by requiring
school districts to "make every effort to achieve the greatest possible
degree" of integration." 4 Alternatively, the OCR could require
districts to take affirmative steps to remedy racial isolation485 although
one obvious shortcoming of such a standard is that it could be
satisfied with minimal effort by the district. Given the political
opposition that such efforts may encounter, the OCR may want to
adopt a moderate standard when it first raises the issue with the
understanding that a more demanding requirement will be adopted at
a later date.
Scholars have noted an important limitation in pursuing a
disparate impact claim. When courts have considered the burden on
the defendant in establishing an educational necessity, they have
accepted justifications that are simply "educationally legitimate" by
allowing defendants to defend their actions by pointing to a policy
that merely "has a demonstrable relationship to a legitimate
educational goal" and courts defer to the judgments of educators on
this issue.486 Thus, courts have infrequently sustained disparate impact
claims.487
However, the OCR does not have to adopt the definition of
educational necessity that courts have promulgated. In other areas,
the OCR previously rejected a Supreme Court interpretation of legal
obligations that it enforces. For example, the OCR's guidance on the
obligation of districts to address sexual harassment noted that while
the Supreme Court requires a victim of sexual harassment to prove
that a recipient was deliberately indifferent to the harassment to
recover monetary damages, the OCR will find schools in violation of
their obligation under Title VI if sexual harassment limits or denies a
student's access to a school's program on the basis of sex, whether or
484. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
485. In relation to addressing the needs of limited-English proficient students, the
OCR requires recipients of federal financial assistance to "take affirmative steps to rectify
the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these students."
Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origin, 35
Fed. Reg. 11,595 (July 18,1970).
486. Ryan, supra note 163, at 1698; see also Losen, supra note 1, at 281 (noting that
courts frequently defer to educational reasons for policies given by educators).
487. Losen, supra note 1, at 280; Ryan, supra note 163, at 1698.
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not the recipient knew or should have known about the
discrimination.'
In place of the current judicial definition of educational
necessity,48 9 the OCR could adopt a more rigorous requirement for
educational necessity that requires a state or district to establish that
the challenged practice is essential to the effective operation of the
educational program. Such a definition of educational necessity
would strongly encourage districts and states to explore and possibly
adopt alternative student assignment policies that do not promote
racial isolation. However, the standard also would allow districts to
defend their student assignment plans if their existing plans are
necessary for the educational effectiveness of the district.
Once the OCR issues new guidance that defines the obligation of
school districts to reduce racial isolation in schools, several issues
must be addressed for the OCR to serve as an effective mechanism
for promoting the reduction of racial isolation. Historically,
complainants do not frequently file complaints alleging a disparate
impact claim.49 The absence of complaints on this basis may simply
be due to a lack of public awareness of the applicability of Title VI to
policies and practices that have a disparate impact on a particular
racial group. This shortcoming could be addressed by providing the
public with greater information about the coverage of the Title VI
regulations and through proactive compliance reviews that do not
rely on outside initiation, which are discussed below.
The enforcement of the Title VI disparate impact regulations
also has been highly subject to the priorities of the governing
administration.49 1 For example, a former investigator for the OCR has
noted that a prior head of the OCR sent a memo to the staff that
instructed them to avoid investigating complaints that alleged a race-
or gender-based disparate impact.492  Some have noted that
enforcement of the disparate impact regulations has been weak, even
during administrations that support such enforcement, and that
488. Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 66 Fed. Reg. 5512 (Jan. 19, 2001).
489. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1412 (11th Cir. 1993)
(defining educational necessity as requiring practices that" ' bear a manifest demonstrable
relationship to classroom education'" (quoting Ga. State Conference of Branches of
NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1418 (11th Cir. 1985))).
490. Losen, supra note 1, at 271-72.
491. Id. at 287-88.
492. Id.; Mica Pollock, Toward Everyday Justice: On Demanding Equal Educational
Opportunity in the New Civil Rights Era, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 245, 263 (2006) (citing Losen,
supra note 1, at 288).
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compliance reviews based upon a disparate impact theory were
infrequent.493 Therefore, the proposed approach would only be viable
under an administration that is committed to addressing how the
growing racial isolation adversely affects minority schoolchildren by
increasing enforcement of the Title VI disparate impact regulations.
Despite the challenges that the OCR enforcement would
encounter, enforcement through the OCR enjoys an important
institutional advantage. The OCR is required by statute to try to
obtain voluntary compliance before it issues a finding that a recipient
has violated Title VI.494 As a result, the OCR engages in a
"partnership process" that typically reaches negotiated settlements
that avoid official findings of Title VI violations. 95 The partnership
approach is designed to generate lasting positive solutions, and the
resulting negotiated settlements enjoy the advantage of avoiding
labeling individual parties as racially discriminatory.496 One scholar
contends that by avoiding labeling a party as discriminatory,
negotiations become more effective at reaching solutions than if they
had to reveal a discriminatory motive or identify a cause for the
disparate impact.497 Therefore, the OCR's ability to negotiate a
recipient's voluntary compliance may enable it to work effectively
with states and districts to remedy racial isolation in the nation's
schools.
b. The Department of Education Should Provide Technical
Assistance That Encourages Districts to Reduce Racial Isolation
To increase state and school district attention on creating diverse
schools, the Department of Education could provide technical
assistance that encourages states and districts to reduce racial
isolation in schools. This assistance could be provided by Equity
Assistance Centers ("Centers") or the OCR. The Centers currently
provide training and technical assistance on how to protect civil rights
in the areas of race, national origin, and sex discrimination to districts
that request it. 498 The Centers also offer training and technical
493. Losen, supra note 1, at 270, 272 (citations omitted).
494. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006).
495. Losen, supra note 1, at 271, 273.
496. Id. at 273.
497. Id. (citing Richard Lazarus, Civil Rights in the New Decade: Highways and Bi-
Ways for Environmental Justice, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 569,575-76 (2000)).
498. OFFICE OF COMMC'NS AND OUTREACH, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. GUIDE TO U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS 302 (2009), http://www.ed.gov/programs/
gtep/gtep.pdf; see also U.S. Dep't of Educ., Training and Advisory Services-Equity
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assistance on the issues that arise in school desegregation.4 99 The
Department of Education also provides one-time grants to school
districts to support revisions to their student assignment plans in a
manner that is consistent with Parents Involved."° The Department
allocation for these grants for fiscal year 2009 was close to $9.5
million which represented a more than $2.5 million increase over the
2008 allocation.50 1 The Department anticipated that in fiscal year 2009
it would provide ten to fifteen new grant awards and continue funding
ten additional awards.5"
A renewed federal effort to promote diverse schools should build
and expand upon this preexisting resource to help states and districts
reconsider existing student assignment plans and develop new
approaches that will better foster diverse schools. While the Centers
currently rely on school district requests to initiate training and
technical assistance,5 3 an expansion of the federal effort to promote
diverse schools should include increasing the number of districts that
receive technical assistance and training from the Centers by having
the Department of Education contact districts that the Department
identifies as in need of assistance in reducing racial isolation.
Additional support for these efforts could be provided if the
President successfully encouraged Congress to authorize
supplemental funds for districts that need financial assistance to
revise their student assignment plans.
Similarly, the OCR currently provides assistance on civil rights
compliance to educational institutions through a variety of
approaches, including conferences, in-person consultations, and
dissemination of materials on civil rights obligations."° Technical
assistance sometimes helps the OCR identify noncompliance and can
lead to compliance agreements between the OCR and a recipient.
In 2008, the OCR gave more than 185 technical assistance
Assistance Centers, http://www.ed.gov/programs/equitycenters/index.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2010) (describing Equity Assistance Centers).
499. OFFICE OF COMMC'NS AND OUTREACH, supra note 498, at 302.
500. Id. at 301-02.
501. Id. at 301.
502. Id. at 302.
503. Id.
504. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS OF THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS FISCAL YEARS 2007-08, at 14 (2009),
http://www.ed.gov/aboutlreports/annual/ocr/annrpt2007-08/annrpt2OO7-08.pdf.
505. MICHELLE LEIGH AVERY ET AL., EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND
NONDISCRIMINATION FOR MINORITY STUDENTS: FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI
IN ABILITY GROUPING PRACTICES 38 (1999), http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/
data/ericdocs2sql/content-storage_01/0000019b/80/16/d2/80.pdf.
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presentations at 150 events.0 6 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
previously commended the OCR "for ... actively and effectively
conducting Title VI education and outreach and technical assistance
... .,"57 Technical assistance definitely represents one of the OCR's
institutional strengths. 08
Under an executive branch effort to promote diverse schools, the
OCR also should provide technical assistance to states and school
districts that seek to develop plans to reduce racial isolation. The
technical assistance should include dissemination of information
about effective efforts to reduce racial isolation, presentations at
conferences on the obligation to reduce racial isolation, and on-site
assistance to recipients. The effectiveness of such assistance would
depend on adequate funding for technical systems and an outreach
effort by the OCR to contact districts to offer technical assistance.
c. Compliance Reviews That Ensure Districts are Meeting Their
Obligation to Reduce Racial Isolation Under Title VI
The OCR conducts reviews of the civil rights compliance of
recipients of federal financial assistance on issues that have a
nationwide impact or that are particularly serious. 9 The OCR
determines where to conduct compliance reviews based upon
information that it receives from parents, the public, education
groups, community groups, and the media and targets sites that will
impact the greatest number of students.510 The OCR has found that
such reviews supplement the complaint resolution process because
they benefit substantial numbers of students when compared to
complaints that sometimes only address one student.5 11
506. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 504, at 14.
507. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP: HAVE FEDERAL
AGENCIES RESPONDED TO CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS? 8 (2004),
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content-storage-01/0000019b/80/28/0
e/36.pdf.
508. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT: THE PRESIDENT'S 2006 REQUEST 14 (2005), http://www.eric.ed.gov/
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/contentstorage01/0000019b/80/28/Oe/3f.pdf (noting that the
OCR surpassed its target goals for technical assistance in 2004).
509. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 504, at 10.
510. Id.; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND
NONDISCRIMINATION FOR STUDENTS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY: FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI AND LAU V. NICHOLs 86 (1997), http://www.eric.ed.gov/
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content -storage -01/0000019b/80/15/26/51.pdf.
511. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 504, at 10.
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Given the low numbers of complaints that have historically been
initiated to enforce the disparate impact regulations,512 an effective
effort by the OCR to reduce racial isolation should include
compliance reviews on this issue. While the OCR initiated 152
compliance reviews in 1997 and resolved 140 reviews, the OCR
initiated 42 compliance reviews in 2008 and resolved 38."' 3 The OCR
has been criticized for weak monitoring of compliance with Title VI
and for devoting inadequate resources to such reviews.514 Additional
staff and resources would have to be allocated to compliance reviews
to enable them to be an effective mechanism for encouraging states
and districts to reduce racial isolation.
B. The Role of the Courts in Future Efforts to Create Diverse Schools
As many of the Court's leading desegregation decisions had the
effect of reconstitutionalizing segregation, it is important to consider
the role of the courts in future efforts to promote diverse schools. The
Court's decision striking down the race-based student assignment
plans in Parents Involved515 will make it exceedingly difficult for
school districts to continue to use a racial classification because such
efforts are unlikely to survive the Court's current interpretation of
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 6 The majority
opinion coupled with Justice Kennedy's endorsement of race-neutral
efforts to end racial isolation in schools has led some districts to adopt
race-neutral approaches to achieve this goal.517
If such efforts are to continue, it will be important for the Court
to adopt an understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that at a
minimum allows districts to pursue such approaches. 18 Under such an
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, school districts would
be given wide latitude to adopt race-neutral approaches to student
assignment that reduce racial isolation and promote diversity because
such efforts will help school districts advance the goals of the Equal
Protection Clause while they avoid many of the potential harms of
512. Losen, supra note 1, at 271-72.
513. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 504, at 3.
514. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT TO INSURE
NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 198,215 (1996).
515. 551 U.S. 701, 732-36 (2007).
516. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 285-94.
517. Emily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, § 6
(Magazine), at 38, 40, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/magazine/
20integration-t.html?_r=l; Susan Eaton, Diversity's Quiet Rebirth, EDUC. WK., Aug. 18,
2008 (available online only through paid subscription service).
518. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 351-60.
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racial classifications." 9 If the Court were to apply a very demanding
interpretation of the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court could erect a constitutional roadblock to such efforts and
further entrench the ways in which its decisions had the effect of
reconstitutionalizing segregated schools.2 °
In addition to ensuring the constitutionality of any voluntary
efforts to reduce racial isolation in schools, the executive branch
would need to make sure that any approach that it adopts is legally
defensible. If the executive branch decided to take action to enforce
the disparate impact regulations under Title VI by initiating efforts to
reduce racial isolation in schools because of the harmful effects of
such schools, the Department of Education's reliance on the disparate
impact regulations might lead a plaintiff to challenge the validity of
these regulations as a valid basis for authorizing the Department's
actions. The Court in Alexander avoided deciding whether the
disparate impact regulations were valid when it held that the Title VI
disparate impact regulations did not authorize a private right of
action against the Alabama Department of Public Safety's official
policy that required drivers' license examinations to be administered
in English.52 The Court was able to avoid deciding this issue because
the petitioners did not raise the issue, and the Court was able to
decide the case before it without reaching the issue by presuming that
the regulations were valid. 2 The Court reached this conclusion by
recognizing that Title VI only prohibits intentional discrimination and
that the disparate impact regulations could not be enforced through
the private right of action that enforces the prohibition against
intentional discrimination because the disparate impact regulations
forbid action that the prohibition on intentional discrimination
permits.23 The Court then reviewed the statutory Section that
authorized the disparate impact regulations and found it void of any
intention to create a private right of action. 24 Therefore, the plaintiffs
could not enforce the disparate impact regulations through a private
right of action.525
The rationale for the Court's determination that Title VI did not
authorize the creation of a private right of action based upon
519. See id.
520. Id. at 361.
521. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279, 293 (2001).
522. Id. at 279, 281-82, 286, 293.
523. Id. at 281-86.
524. Id. at 288-93.
525. Id. at 293.
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disparate impact suggests that the Court might find the disparate
impact regulations invalid.2 6 Justice Scalia strongly suggested that the
regulations were invalid when he noted "how strange it is" to contend
that the disparate impact regulations seek to enforce Title VI's
prohibition on intentional discrimination when the prohibition on
intentional discrimination "permits the very behavior that the
regulations forbid. 5 27 The opinion suggests that the Court could find
the disparate impact regulations invalid under Title VI. However,
given the fact that the Court previously held that Title VI is a
legitimate exercise of congressional authority under the Spending
Clause, 28 Congress could overturn the Supreme Court's invalidation
of the disparate impact regulations by enacting an amendment to
Title VI that prohibits disparate impact discrimination. 29 Such
legislation could include a private right of action to enforce this
prohibition. Indeed, legislation that would accomplish this has been
proposed in Congress, but the proposed legislation has not been
enacted.530 A Supreme Court decision that invalidated the disparate
impact regulations might be sufficient to galvanize enough support to
enact such legislation.
If the Supreme Court invalidates the Title VI disparate impact
regulations it could undermine efforts to promote diverse schools and
further entrench the effect of prior decisions. While Congress could
take action to overcome a Court decision that invalidated the
disparate impact regulations, this Article's recognition that the
526. See John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implications for
Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2002).
527. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286 n.6.
528. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974).
529. The Supreme Court in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), recently held
that a fire department could not discard results from a promotional examination that had a
disparate impact on minorities without a "strong basis in evidence" that the fire
department would be liable under the disparate impact regulations under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Id. at 2681. Justice Scalia acknowledged in a
separate concurring opinion that the Court's decision delayed the Court's assessment of
whether the disparate impact regulations under Title VII are consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause, and he acknowledged ways in which the regulations could be
inconsistent and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 2682-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). For example,
Justice Scalia argued that the disparate impact regulations require employers to make
race-based decisions that are themselves discriminatory. Id. at 2682. Given this
concurrence, Justice Scalia might find that congressional enactment of a statute that
prohibits disparate impact discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause's
prohibition on intentional discrimination. However, given the refusal of the remaining
justices to join his concurrence, Justice Scalia might not be able to garner enough votes to
make his view the law of the land.
530. Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554, 110th Cong.; Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129,
110th Cong.
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Court's prior decisions had the effect of reconstitutionalizing
segregation highlights the importance of the Court's role in the
development or maintenance of diverse schools. Even if the executive
branch leads a renewed effort to create diverse schools, any such
effort must consider the potential role of the Court in hindering or
supporting such efforts.
CONCLUSION
The effect of many of the Supreme Court's leading school
desegregation decisions was to reconstitutionalize segregated schools
for minority and White schoolchildren. When coupled with the
Court's failure to address school finance inequities, 5 1 the Supreme
Court's decisions laid a constitutional foundation that has led to many
minority schoolchildren receiving a separate and inferior education.532
Moreover, racial isolation in schools is increasing,5 33 and thus the
future is likely to see more minority schoolchildren in substandard
schools.
A renewed federal effort is needed to reverse the growing racial
isolation in schools. Given the obstacles that the Court erected to
effective school desegregation and the great difficulty that new
legislation would face in Congress, such an effort should be led by the
President and the Department of Education. To ensure that the
nation understands the need to remedy racial isolation in schools, the
President should use the bully pulpit to increase public attention to
this issue. Then the President should issue an executive order that
establishes the blueprint for executive action to promote diverse
schools. The President should establish a commission to study and
engage the public in a dialogue on these issues and to make policy
recommendations. In addition, the President should appoint a
presidential advisor that would ensure that the commission's
recommendations are implemented.
Among the possible policy reforms, the Department of
Education should issue guidance under the Title VI disparate impact
regulation that identifies a failure to address racial isolation as a
potential violation of the regulation. The Department of Education
also should apply a rigorous definition of "educational necessity" that
encourages districts and states to consider if they can accomplish their
educational goals while simultaneously diversifying their schools. The
531. See supra notes 321-30 and accompanying text.
532. Liu, supra note 1, at 73; ORFIELD & LEE,supra note 1, at 5, 11.
533. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 1, at 3.
[Vol. 88
2010] RESURRECTING THE PROMISE OF BROWN 875
OCR should offer technical assistance on how to comply with the
disparate impact regulation, and the Equity Assistance Centers also
should increase their technical assistance to assist districts in
understanding how they can best promote diverse schools. Finally,
compliance reviews that enforce the disparate impact regulations
would help to ensure that the requirement is satisfied.
The greatest obstacle to a renewed federal effort to promote
diverse schools will be garnering the political will to raise and
champion this important issue. 34 The political will may only
develop-if it develops at all-when the nation understands the many
well-documented costs associated with the growing racial isolation in
schools and the benefits of diverse school settings. 35 Scholars have
also documented the high costs that the nation pays for the disparities
in educational opportunities. 36 In the face of such evidence, the
executive branch and ultimately the American people may still
choose the status quo. Such a choice would further betray Brown's
promise of equal educational opportunity and solidify the deeply
entrenched inequities that hinder the nation's schoolchildren from
reaching their full potential. It is not only schoolchildren but also the
entire nation that loses if we fail to address the growing racial
isolation and the accompanying inequities in our schools. However, if
the political will can be generated, a renewed federal effort to
promote diverse schools should be pursued because creating diverse
schools has proven to yield important benefits and has enabled many
Americans to receive a high-quality education and achieve the
American dream. 37
534. See HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 318, at 29, 31.
535. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 1, at 1; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for
a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1653, 1743 (2007) ("Reform advocates could develop a successful campaign to
address inequitable educational opportunities if the nation experienced a wake-up call
similar to the one it experienced after the release of the 1983 report A Nation at Risk
..... ); Robinson, supra note 6, at 325-36; Wells & Frankenberg, supra note 6, at 179-83.
536. See generally THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
INADEQUATE EDUCATION, supra note 402 (suggesting that poor educational
opportunities result in lower productivity of the labor force, reduction of incomes and tax
revenues, and increased public expenditures on healthcare, crime, and public assistance
measures).
537. HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 318, at 29 ("If it were politically
feasible, a continued effort along these [desegregation] lines would be educationally
beneficial. Ending legal segregation in schools and other public facilities, fostering real,
not just legal, desegregation, did more to move the American dream from ideology to
practice than has any other public policy or private effort.").
